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Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private
preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous
marginals, in which the added value of any item to a set is either 0 or 1, and aim to design
truthful allocation mechanisms (without money) that maximize welfare and are fair. For the
case that players have submodular valuations with dichotomous marginals, we design such
a deterministic truthful allocation mechanism. The allocation output by our mechanism is
Lorenz dominating, and consequently satisfies many desired fairness properties, such as being
envy-free up to any item (EFX), and maximizing the Nash Social Welfare (NSW). We then
show that our mechanism with random priorities is envy-free ex-ante, while having all the
above properties ex-post. Furthermore, we present several impossibility results precluding
similar results for the larger class of XOS valuations.
To gauge the robustness of our positive results, we also study ǫ-dichotomous valuations,
in which the added value of any item to a set is either non-positive, or in the range [1, 1+ ǫ].
We show several impossibility results in this setting, and also a positive result: for players
that have additive ǫ-dichotomous valuations with sufficiently small ǫ, we design a randomized
truthful mechanism with strong ex-post guarantees. For ρ = 1
1+ǫ
, the allocations that it
produces generate at least a ρ-fraction of the maximum welfare, and enjoy ρ-approximations
for various fairness properties, such as being envy-free up to one item (EF1), and giving each
player at least her maximin share.
1 Introduction
A central problem in Algorithmic Game Theory is the problem of allocating indivisible goods
among players with private preferences. This problem is particularly challenging in settings
in which utilities cannot be transferred between players (no money). One consideration in
allocating the items is the economic efficiency of the allocation, as we want the best for society
as a whole. Another consideration is fairness of the allocation, because in the absence of money,
there is no other way for the players to evenly share the welfare generated by the efficient
allocation.
Thus, in this work we design allocation mechanisms that enjoy desirable properties, related
to their economic efficiency, to fairness of the allocation, and to incentive compatibility (truth-
fulness). Importantly, we consider only settings without money, so a mechanism defines an
allocation rule, but does not involve a payment rule, as there are no payments. With general
valuations, even without any fairness properties, the VCG mechanism is the unique truthful
welfare-maximizing mechanism, and it requires payments. Consequently, the focus of our work
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is on instances in which the valuation functions of the agents are restricted, and specifically,
have the dichotomous marginals property. We say that a valuation function f has dichotomous
marginals (or for brevity, we simply say that f is dichotomous) if for every set S of items
and every additional item a, the marginal value of a relative to S is either 0 or 1. Namely,
f(S ∪ a)− f(S) ∈ {0, 1}.
The study of fairness with dichotomous preferences was initiated by Bogomolnaia and
Moulin [14], with additional extensive research of such preferences in various settings (see e.g.
[15, 48, 31, 17, 38, 46]). The above references provide multiple examples of situations that can
be modeled using dichotomous preferences. Next we provide another example that involves
constraints not captured by prior work. Consider a setting where the agents are arts students
seeking work as museum guides. The items are different shifts in which the students can work
as guides in the local arts museum. Suppose that among the shifts (or combinations of shifts)
that are feasible for a given student in a given month (for example, one student cannot work
on weekends, another student can work at most two shifts a week, etc.), the student may wish
to work for as many shifts as possible during the month, but other than that is indifferent
to the exact choice of shifts (as long as the combination of shifts is feasible for the student).
A model that first-order approximates this setting is one in which the valuation function of
a student is modeled as being dichotomous.1 The allocation problem is to assign students to
shifts. Economic efficiency may correspond to filling as many shifts as possible. Fairness may
correspond to trying to equalize the number of shifts that each student receives (subject to
the feasibility constraints). Incentive compatibility means that it is a dominant strategy for a
student to report her true valuation function to the museum – providing an incorrect report
cannot lead to a situation in which she receives a bundle of shifts of higher value to her.
1.1 Our Contribution and Techniques
We now provide an overview of our main results. Some definitions and technicalities are omitted
from this overview, but can be found in Section 2.
We consider settings with a finite set M of m indivisible and non-identical items. There
is a set of n ≥ 2 players (a.k.a. agents), denoted by V = [n], with each player v ∈ V having
a valuation function fv over sets of items. The value (or utility) of player v for a set S ⊆ M
is denoted by fv(S). We always assume that any valuation f is normalized (f(∅) = 0) and
non-decreasing (f(S) ≤ f(T ) for S ⊆ T ⊆M). Given an allocation A, we use Av to denote the
set of items allocated to player v.
One question that we ask in this work is what is the largest class of dichotomous valuation
functions for which one has a truthful deterministic allocation mechanism that enjoys good
economic efficiency and fairness properties. Before presenting our results, let us briefly discuss
its various ingredients.
Classes of valuation functions. The dichotomous versions of some simple classes of
valuation functions were considered in previous work (e.g., unit demand (matching) [14], addi-
tive [46] and 0/1 valued sets [17]). We consider here the hierarchy of complement-free valuation
functions introduced in [41], whose four highest classes (in order of containment) are gross sub-
stitutes (GS), submodular, XOS, and subadditive (recall that both unit demand and additive
are gross substitutes). For valuations with dichotomous marginals, it can be shown that every
submodular function is in fact a Matroid Rank Function (MRF), and hence also gross substi-
tutes. We note that valuation functions may be used to express not only the preferences of
the players, but also constraints imposed by the allocator. In the museum example above, the
1We later discuss relaxing the assumption that all desired shifts are equivalent for the student, allowing strict
preference, while still assuming approximately the same marginals.
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museum may impose a restriction that no student can work in two shifts in the same day, and
another restriction that no student can work in five shifts in the same week. If a student has
an additive valuation function, then incorporating these constraints into her valuation function
makes it submodular.
Economic efficiency. We wish our allocations to maximize welfare, where the welfare of
allocation A is defined as
∑
v∈V fv(Av). Restricting attention to non-redundant allocations (no
item can be removed from a set allocated to a player without decreasing its value), in the setting
of dichotomous valuations, maximizing welfare is equivalent to allocating the maximum possible
number of items. Hence maximizing welfare can serve as a measure of economic efficiency not
only from the point of view of the players, but also from the point of view of the items (as in
the museum guides example, where it is in the interest of the museum to fill as many shifts as
possible).
Fairness. For allocation mechanisms without money it is customary to impose some fairness
requirements. They come in many flavors. Safety guarantees (such as proportionality, maximin
share2) promise the player a certain minimum value, based only on the valuation function of
the given player and no matter what the valuation functions of other players are. Envy-freeness
guarantees (envy free up to one good (EF1), envy free up to any good (EFX)), ensure that
every player v is at least as happy with her own bundle of goods as she would be with the
bundle received by any other player (perhaps up to one good (EF1), or up to any good (EFX)).
Egalitarian guarantees (lexicographically maximal allocations, Lorenz-dominating allocations,
maximizing Nash social welfare (NSW)) attempt to equalize the utilities of all players (to the
extent possible, given their valuation functions). Not all fairness notions are attainable in all
settings, and in addition, there are settings in which two fairness notions that are attainable are
not attainable simultaneously. For this reason, in our work we do not fix one particular fairness
notion, but rather attempt to achieve a good mix of fairness properties.
Truthfulness. We wish our mechanisms to have the property that reporting her true
valuation function is a (weakly) dominant strategy for every player. That is, for every player v,
whatever the reports of other players are, if player v reports a valuation function different than
fv, the allocation she gets cannot have higher value to her, compared to the allocation when
she reports fv.
We now return to our question concerning the largest class of dichotomous valuation func-
tions for which one has a truthful deterministic allocation mechanism that enjoys good economic
efficiency and fairness properties. We address this question in the framework of the hierarchy
of complement-free valuation functions defined in [41]. Our first main result shows that if the
dichotomous valuation functions are submodular, then a deterministic mechanism that we refer
to as prioritized egalitarian (PE) indeed satisfies the above requirements.
Theorem 1 The prioritized egalitarian (PE) mechanism has the following properties when
players have submodular dichotomous valuations:
1. Being truthful is a dominant strategy.
2. When players are truthful the allocation is welfare maximizing.
3. When players are truthful, the allocation of the mechanism is a Lorenz dominating alloca-
tion, and consequently it enjoys additional fairness properties, including maximizing Nash
social welfare, and being envy-free up to any item (EFX). If furthermore, the valuations
are additive dichotomous, the allocation gives every player at least her maximin share.
2The maximin share of player p is the maximum value that could be given to the least happy player if all
players had the same valuation function as that of p.
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4. If the valuations of players have succinct representations (that allow computation of func-
tion values in polynomial time), then the mechanism can be implemented in polynomial
time.
In contrast, we show that if the valuation functions belong to the class XOS (one level
higher than submodular in the hierarchy of [41]), then there is no truthful allocation mechanism
(neither deterministic nor randomized) that maximizes welfare, even if one disregards all fairness
considerations. For this and some other impossibility results see Appendix D.
The PE mechanism is based on first proving that in the setting of submodular dichotomous
valuation functions there always is a Lorenz dominating allocation (exact definitions will follow,
but at this point the reader may think a Lorenz dominating allocation as one that both maxi-
mizes welfare and equalizes as much as possible the number of items received by each player).
The PE mechanism imposes a priority order σ among players, and chooses a non-redundant3
Lorenz dominating allocation (namely, it does not allocate items that give 0 marginal value
to the player receiving them), breaking ties among Lorenz dominating allocations in favor of
higher priority players. Proving economic efficiency and fairness properties for this mechanism
is straightforward, given the fact that the output allocation is Lorenz dominating. The main
technical content in the proof of Theorem 1 (beyond the proof that a Lorenz dominating al-
location exists) is to show that the PE mechanism is truthful (for players with submodular
dichotomous valuations).
In Section 3.3 we consider a randomized variation of our PE allocation mechanism. This
randomized mechanism first assigns the agents priorities uniformly at random, and then runs
the PE allocation mechanism with the drawn priorities. We show that this mechanism achieves
Envy-Freeness in expectation (ex-ante), is universally truthful and it obtains all the other good
properties of the PE mechanism ex-post (a best-of-both-worlds result).
Armed with the above results for dichotomous valuations, we study whether our positive
results are robust in face of slight violations of the dichotomous assumption. For simplicity of
the presentation, consider the special case of additive dichotomous valuations. The dichotomous
assumption models situations in which items of value 1 are “desirable” whereas items of value 0
are not desirable, and an agent is indifferent among items that she finds desirable (and likewise,
indifferent among items that she finds undesirable). A natural relaxation for the undesirable
items is to allow them to have arbitrary non-positive value. It turns out that the PE mechanism
(and other natural mechanisms that are not required to allocate all items) is robust to this
relaxation of 0, because it only allocates an item to an agent if the agent reports a positive
marginal value for the item. Consequently, we shall not bother with this relaxation (that only
complicates terminology but has no effect on the results), and assume that undesirable items
always have a value of 0. A natural relaxation for the desirable items is to allow each of them
to have an arbitrary value in the range [1, 1 + ǫ], for some small ǫ > 0 (where the case ǫ = 0
corresponds to dichotomous valuations). Consequently, a player can attribute slightly different
values to her desirable items, and can strictly prefer one desirable item over another. We require
ǫ to be sufficiently small so that the preference order that an agent has over sets of desirable
items remains in favor of the larger set. We refer to this setting as that of ǫ-leveled valuations4.
More generally, we have the notion of ǫ-dichotomous valuations that can be applied also to
submodular valuations (and not just additive ones), though we defer the formal definition to
3 In Appendix F we discuss the issue of non-redundancy, showing that the result of Theorem 1 is impossible
to obtain when one insists on allocating all items (even undesired ones). Specifically, we show that there is no
truthful deterministic allocation mechanism that always allocates all items, maximizes welfare and is EFX. This
holds even for additive dichotomous valuations, and even for only two agents.
4The term leveled was introduced in [8] to refer to valuations in which a larger set is always preferred to a
smaller one, and we adopt this term here.
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Section 2.
Let ρ = 11+ǫ . If the players truthfully report their ǫ-dichotomous valuations, one may round
the value of each set down to the nearest integer, and by this obtain dichotomous valuations.
Thereafter, one may allow the PE mechanism to choose an allocation, and obtain all the guar-
antees of the PE mechanism up to a multiplicative factor of ρ. Likewise, no player can gain
more than a 1 + ǫ factor in her utility by providing an incorrect report to this mechanism (the
player cannot increase the number of desirable items that she receives, but she might possibly be
able to manipulate the identity of these items), and hence the mechanism may be referred to as
being ǫ-truthful. However, strictly speaking, this mechanism is not truthful (for ǫ-dichotomous
valuations), because a player who cares about small differences in her utility may indeed find it
beneficial to misreport her valuation function. Moreover, once players misreport their valuation
functions, the welfare generated by the resulting allocation might be much smaller than the
maximum welfare.
It turns out that there are fundamental limits on truthful mechanisms for ǫ-dichotomous
valuations. For the case of submodular (in fact, even just unit demand) ǫ-dichotomous valuations
we show that no truthful allocation mechanism (neither deterministic nor randomized) can
approximate the maximum welfare with a ratio better than 12 . When restricting attention to
ǫ-leveled valuations, there are deterministic truthful mechanisms that generate at least a ρ-
fraction of the maximum welfare (e.g., let every player in order of priority select all items that
she desires among remaining items). However, we show that for ǫ-leveled valuations, there is no
deterministic truthful mechanism that allocates all desirable items and satisfies the following
weak fairness requirement: for settings with n players, if a player reports n items as desirable,
the player receives at least one of the reported items. Moreover, there is no truthful allocation
mechanism (neither deterministic nor randomized) that maximizes welfare when valuations are
ǫ-leveled.
The above impossibility results lead us to consider randomized allocation mechanisms for
additive ǫ-dichotomous valuations. We require our randomized mechanisms to be truthful in
expectation (TIE): misreporting a valuation function cannot increase the expected utility of a
player. TIE is a property that holds before the random allocation mechanism tosses its coins. In
addition, our mechanisms preserve the ǫ-truthfulness property mentioned above, and this prop-
erty holds ex-post (even after the player sees the coin tosses of the mechanism). As to economic
efficiency and fairness properties, we relax them, being content with a 11+ǫ approximations of
them. Importantly, we require these guarantees to hold in an ex-post manner, namely, for every
realization of the randomness of the underlying randomized allocation mechanism.
Our second main result concerns a new randomized allocation mechanism that we refer to
as ML.
Theorem 2 Let ǫ < 1
nm3
and ρ = 11+ǫ . When all n players have ǫ-leveled valuations, the
randomized allocation mechanism ML has the following properties:
1. ML is truthful in expectation and ex-post ǫ-truthful.
2. If all players are truthful, then the allocation output by ML provides at least a ρ-fraction
of the maximum welfare (ex-post).
3. ML guarantees every truthful player at least a ρ-fraction of her maximin share, and is
ρ-EF1 (envy free up to one good, up to a multiplicative factor of ρ). These guarantees hold
ex-post. Moreover, the expected utility received by a truthful player is at least a 1n -fraction
of her value for the grand bundle of all items (i.e., proportional in expectation).
4. The mechanism runs in polynomial time.
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Our randomized mechanism ML is based on the PE mechanism. It first rounds down all re-
ported values to the nearest integer, thus obtaining dichotomous additive valuations. As simply
running the PE mechanism on the rounded valuation does not create a truthful mechanism, we
modify the mechanism to obtain truthfulness using some randomization. This randomization
involves two components. One, that is very natural from a fairness perspective, is to choose a
priority order σ uniformly at random (unlike the deterministic PE mechanism for which σ is
fixed in advance). The other component, a trick that we introduce and that may be of value also
elsewhere, is to hold out at random either one or two of the items. For the items not held out,
referred to here as the main items, ML allocates them using the PE mechanism with priority
order σ. As to the items held out, ML allocates them using a priority based mechanism, but
with a priority order σ′ that is the reverse of σ. For the first item held out, among the players
that desire it (if there is any), the player with highest priority (according to σ′) receives it, and
her priority is reduced to being last. If there is also a second item that is held out, then it is
allocated according to this new priority order.
Let us briefly explain the main argument why mechanism ML is truthful in expectation.
Consider player v for which Dv is the set of all desirable items of non-zero value (hence of
value in the range [1, 1+ ǫ]). Truthfulness of the deterministic mechanism PE (for dichotomous
valuations) implies that for every outcome of the random coin tosses of ML, reporting her true
Dv maximizes the number of desirable items that i receives. Hence the most that v can gain by a
non-truthful report is an added value of ǫ|Dv| ≤ ǫm ≤ 1nm2 . Hence even if there is probability of
only 1nm2 of losing a desirable item by misreporting, non-truthful reporting becomes inferior to
truthful reporting. And indeed, the allocation rule for the held-out items is designed such that
non-truthful reporting causes a loss of a desirable item with high enough probability, making
such a report dominated. We remark that the proof of truthfulness does not require σ′ to be
the reverse of σ. The fact that one priority order is the reverse of the other is only used in
establishing fairness properties of ML (item 3 in Theorem 2).
More details concerning our results appear in subsequent sections. Due to space limitations,
most proofs (including the statements of some lemmas) are deferred to the appendix.
1.2 Related Work
1.2.1 Previous Work
Dichotomous preferences: The study of dichotomous preferences was initiated by Bogo-
molnaia and Moulin (BM) [14]. They consider dichotomous matching problems (two-sided
unit-demand preferences) and suggest the randomized Lorenz mechanism to get a probabilistic
allocation that is fair in expectation. Within the setting of one-sided markets, the paper of BM
addresses randomized mechanisms for unit-demand valuations. We consider the more general
class of submodular valuations, and our main focus is on ex-post fairness. Dichotomous pref-
erences have been further studied extensively in the literature for mechanisms without money
[15, 31, 17, 38, 46], auction design (with private value scaling) [7, 43] and exchanges [48, 5].
Maybe the most closely related to our paper is the work of Ortega [46] which studies the
Multi-unit assignment problem (MAP) with dichotomous valuations. MAP is a sub-class of the
submodular class that slightly extends additive (but does not contain unit demand, for exam-
ple). The paper suggests picking a fractional ”welfarist” solution (vector of fractional utilities)
that is Lorenz dominating among those that maximize welfare. Being fractional, this corre-
sponds to a randomized allocation mechanism rather than a deterministic one. Consequently,
the notion of truthfulness used is that of being truthful in expectation. Moreover, the notion
of truthfulness is further restricted there, and only allows to conceal desired items in the re-
port, but not to report undesirable items as desired. Under this notion, the solution is group
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strategyproof. In contrast, the larger class of submodular dichotomous valuations considered
in our work contains unit-demand dichotomous valuations, for which no Pareto optimal deter-
ministic allocation mechanism is strongly group strategyproof [14]. Being Lorenz dominating,
the fractional solution enjoys multiple fairness properties. The work of [46] does not explicitly
address the question of to what extent these fairness properties are preserved ex-post, after the
fractional solution is rounded to an integer solution.
Fairness: The literature of fairness is too extensive to survey in this paper, so we only
mention the most related papers. For a general introduction see [19, 18, 44].
Three types of fairness criteria are commonly studied:
Maximin: Budish [20] has introduced the notion of maximin fairness. Kurokawa et al.
[39] showed that even for the simple case of additive valuations, the maximin share cannot be
given to everyone simultaneously. The valuations used in the proof are ǫ-leveled, implying that
we cannot aim for exact maximin fairness even for players with ǫ-leveled valuations. Constant
approximations to the maximin share were presented in [32, 34].
EF1: Envy-free up to one good (EF1) was defined by Budish [20]. EF1 allocations always
exist and can be computed efficiently [42]. Bei et al. [11] studied the price of fairness for
indivisible goods in terms and welfare, showing that welfare loss might be as large as Θ(n) if
valuations are not restricted. Caragiannis et al. [22] proved that for positive additive utilities,
a rule based on maximizing Nash social welfare finds an allocation that is both EF1 and Pareto
optimal, yet, Lee [40] showed that finding such a maximal NSW allocation is APX-hard. Barman
et al. [9] developed a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for finding allocations that are EF1 and
Pareto efficient. When the valuations are bounded the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
EFX: Envy-free up to any good (EFX) was introduced by Caragiannis et al. [22]. Plaut
and Roughgarden [47] showed existence of EFX allocations when there are two players. They
also exhibited an instance with two players and items with zero marginals, where no allocation
is both Pareto optimal and EFX. Recent papers [21, 24] showed that for additive players there
exists an EFX allocation that allocates almost all the items. Amanatidis et al. [4] showed that
when items have only two possible values then NSW maximization implies EFX, and therefore
EFX allocations always exist.
Truthful Fair Allocation Mechanisms: Amanatidis et al. [3] characterized deterministic
truthful allocation mechanisms for the case of two additive players (with unrestricted values),
implying strong fairness impossibilities. Amanatidis et al. [2] studied deterministic truthful
allocation mechanisms for approximating the maximin share for additive valuations. Several
papers [25, 45] have presented randomized truthful allocation mechanisms that are fair in ex-
pectation. Segal-Halevi [49] studied truthful allocation mechanisms where items can be shared
(fractionally allocated) between agents, and showed that the number of shared items can be
made smaller than the number of agents.
Best-of-Both-Worlds: Freeman et al. [30] presented a recursive probabilistic serial al-
location mechanism for additive valuations. They showed that ex-ante envy-freeness can be
achieved in combination with EF1 ex-post. Moreover, they showed that achieving EF ex-ante,
and EF1 and PO ex-post is impossible. We, in contrast, are able to achieve all these properties
(even for submodular valuations) as we consider dichotomous valuations. Aleksandrov et al. [1]
considered allocation mechanism of additive dichotomous agents when items arrive online that
is both EF ex-ante and EF1 ex-post. We consider the offline setting, but for the more general
submodular valuations case, and get stronger fairness guarantees (EFX, Lorentz domination).
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1.2.2 Independent and Concurrent Work
We devise a deterministic allocation mechanism that is truthful, efficient, Lorenz-dominating
and EFX fair. We also show that a randomized variant of this allocation mechanism is uni-
versally truthful and stochastically envy free, while being efficient and ex-post EFX fair for
dichotomous submodular valuations. Recently there has been a surge in papers closely related
to ours, and we next survey several recent works which present independent and concurrent
research that is highly related to our paper.
Concurrent and independent of our work, Halpern et al. [36] devise an allocation mechanism
for the class of additive dichotomous valuations. They show that their MNWtie deterministic
allocation mechanism is EF1, PO, and weakly group strategyproof. The additive dichotomous
valuations setting is a special case of our more general setting of submodular dichotomous val-
uations, and our PE mechanism and MNWtie are identical for this special case. Halpern et al.
[36] also obtain a “best of both worlds” type result. They consider a randomized allocation
mechanism based on rounding the fractional Nash Social Welfare maximizing allocation, and
show that their mechanism is ex-ante weakly group strategyproof and ex-post PO and EF1.
Aziz [6] reproves a similar result, using the same fractional allocation (and noting that it is
in fact ex-ante strongly group strategy proof), but using a different rounding procedure. Our
best-of-both-world result5 (Theorem 10) holds for submodular dichotomous valuations, whereas
the results of [36] and [6] hold only for dichotomous additive valuations. Moreover, our random-
ized mechanism is universally truthful (agents have no regret even after they see the realized
allocation), whereas it is not known whether this property holds for the mechanisms of [36]
and [6]. For submodular dichotomous valuations, no mechanism can be simultaneously ex-ante
strongly group strategy proof and ex-post EF1 (see Appendix G), and in our work we do not
attempt to achieve ex-ante weak strategy proofness.
Another concurrent and independent work is of Benabbou et al. [12], that shows how to find
welfare-maximizing and EF1 allocations for dichotomous submodular valuations in a computa-
tional efficient way. Their result is purely algorithmic and does not consider incentives, whereas
we solve the harder problem of designing a truthful mechanism that obtains all desired fairness
and economic efficiency properties (while being computationally efficient).
2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider settings with a finite set M of m indivisible and non-identical items. There is a
set of n ≥ 2 players, denoted by V = [n], with each player v ∈ V having a valuation function
fv over sets of items. The value (or utility) of player v for a set S ⊆ M is denoted by fv(S).
We always assume that a valuation function f is normalized (f(∅) = 0) and non-decreasing
(f(S) ≤ f(T ) for S ⊆ T ⊆M).
2.1 Valuations
In this paper we consider several classes of valuation functions. The marginal value of item
a ∈ M given a set S ⊆ M is defined to be f(a|S) = f(S ∪ {a}) − f(S). Next we define some
properties of valuation functions we will be using:
5The version of our paper posted in February 2020 did not contain Theorem 10, which was added to the
current version in response to comments received on the previous version by Herve Moulin. Likewise, it did not
contain Appendix G, whose addition to the current version was motivated by the appearance of [36] and [6]. Our
previous version did contain the deterministic allocation mechanism for submodular dichotomous valuations, and
the randomized allocation mechanism for ǫ-dichotomous valuations (which can be viewed as a best-of-both-world
result).
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• A valuation function f is dichotomous if the marginal value of any item is either 0 or 1,
that is, f(a|S) = f(S ∪ {a}) − f(S) ∈ {0, 1} for every set S ⊆M and item a ∈M .
• A valuation function is additive if f(S)+ f(T ) = f(S ∪T ) for any disjoint sets S, T ⊆M .
• A valuation function f is submodular if f(S ∪ {a})− f(S) ≥ f(T ∪ {a})− f(T ) for every
pair of sets S ⊆ T ⊆M and every item a ∈M .
• A valuation function f is a Matroid Rank Function (MRF) if there exists a matroid6 for
which for every set S it holds that f(S) is the rank of set S in the matroid.
• For ǫ ≥ 0, a submodular valuation function f is ǫ-dichotomous if the marginal value of
any item is either 0 or belongs to the set [1, 1+ǫ], that is, f(S∪{a})−f(S) ∈ {0, [1, 1+ǫ]}
for every set S ⊆M and item a ∈M .
• For ǫ ≥ 0, an additive valuation function f that is ǫ-dichotomous is called ǫ-leveled.
A valuation function f is submodular dichotomous if it is both submodular and dichoto-
mous. It is known (follows from the matroid exchange property) that a function is submodular
dichotomous if and only if it is a rank function of a matroid, thus, for brevity we will often refer
to a submodular dichotomous valuation function as an MRF valuation. An interesting special
case of submodular dichotomous valuations are such valuations that are additive. A valuation
function f is additive dichotomous if it is both additive and dichotomous. Note that a 0-leveled
valuation is simply an additive dichotomous valuation.
For player v with a submodular valuation fv, the set Dv ⊆ M of items demanded by v
includes every item a ∈ M such that fv({a}) > 0. Observe that for an additive valuation, the
value fv(S) of the set S is fv(S) =
∑
a∈S fv({a}) =
∑
a∈S∩Dv
fv({a}). If fv is both dichotomous
and additive then fv(S) is simply fv(S) = |S ∩ Dv| and we call the set Dv the demand of v
(and due to additivity the value of every item in the demand is independent of other items the
player receives). For item a ∈ Dv we say that player v desires (or demands, or wants) item a.
2.2 Allocations
We consider mechanisms to allocate items in M to the players. As we assume that utilities can-
not be transfered and there is no money, a mechanism will only specify the allocation function,
mapping valuation functions to allocations. We will mostly consider deterministic allocation
functions.
An allocation (A1, A2, . . . , An) with Av ⊆ M for every v ∈ V and ∪vAv ⊆ M , is an assign-
ment of items to players, possibly leaving some items unallocated. We denote by Av the set of
items allocated to player v under allocation A. The value (or utility) of allocation A for player
v that has valuation function fv is fv(Av).
Fix some valuation functions f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn). The welfare of an allocation A given f
is
∑
v fv(Av) and an allocation is welfare maximizing if there is no other allocation with larger
welfare. Note that a welfare maximizing allocation is Pareto optimal. An allocation A is called
non-redundant for f if it does not give any player an item for which she has no marginal value,
that is, for any player v and any item a ∈ Av it holds that fv(Av) > fv(Av \{a}), or equivalently,
every strict subset of Av has strictly lower value for v. We note that for MRF valuation f , for
any non-redundant set S it holds that f(S) = |S|. A non-redundant allocation has maximal
6A matroid (U , I) is constructed from a non-empty ground set U and a nonempty family I of subsets of U ,
called the independent subsets of U . I must be downward-closed (if T ∈ I and S ⊆ T , then S ∈ I) and satisfy
the exchange property (if S, T ∈ I and |S| < |T |, then there is some element x ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ {x} ∈ I).
The rank of a set S is the size of the largest independent set contained in S.
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size with respect to f , if there is no other non-redundant allocation with respect to f that
allocates more items. We say that an allocation is reasonable for f if it both non-redundant
and has maximal size with respect to f . Note that if all players have dichotomous additive
valuations, any reasonable allocation is welfare maximizing. Additionally, if players have ǫ-
dichotomous valuations, any reasonable allocation gets at least 11+ǫ -fraction of the maximum
welfare allocation (Observation 25).
2.3 Mechanisms
An allocation mechanism (without money) maps profiles of valuations to an allocation. That
is, given valuation functions f = (f1, . . . , fn) an allocation mechanism M outputs an allocation
A = M(f) = M(f1, . . . , fn). We sometimes abbreviate and call an allocation mechanism
simply a mechanism. A mechanism asks each player to report a valuation function, getting a
report f ′v from each player v, and allocates the items by running the mechanism on the reported
valuations (f ′1, . . . , f
′
n), that is, mechanismM outputs A =M(f ′1, . . . , f ′n). We are interested in
mechanisms that are truthful, that is, give players incentives to report their valuation function
truthfully. A mechanism M is truthful if for every player v, reporting fv is a weakly dominant
strategy (maximizes her value given any reports of the other players).
We say that a mechanism M has property P if for any input f , its output allocation
A =M(f) has property P . For example, a mechanism is reasonable if for any f the allocation
A =M(f) is reasonable for f .
2.4 Fairness
The list below presents standard fairness conditions that one may desire.
1. The maximin share of a player i with valuation fi, denoted by maximin(fi), is the max-
imum over all partitions of the items into n disjoint bundles S1, . . . , Sn of the minimum
value according to fi of a bundle, minj∈[n] fi(Sj). The optimal partition depends on fi.
An allocation that gives each player a bundle of value at least as high as his maximin
share is called maximin fair.
2. An allocation is envy free (EF) if every player prefers the bundle that he himself received
over every bundle that some other player received. Formally, for every i ∈ [n], let fi
denote the valuation function of player i and let Ai denote the bundle received by player
i. Then an allocation is envy free if for all i, j ∈ [n] it holds that fi(Ai) ≥ fi(Aj). In
the context of allocation of indivisible goods, envy freeness is incompatible with economic
efficiency. For example, if there is only one item and two players who desire it, the only
envy free solution is not to allocate the item at all. Consequently, the literature considers
the following relaxed versions of envy freeness:
(a) Envy free up to one good (EF1). The envy free condition is relaxed as follows: for
all i, j ∈ [n] either fi(Ai) ≥ fi(Aj), or there is an item e ∈ Aj such that fi(Ai) ≥
fi(Aj \ {e}).
(b) Envy free up to any good (EFX). For all i, j ∈ [n] either fi(Ai) ≥ fi(Aj), or for every
item e ∈ Aj it holds that fi(Ai) ≥ fi(Aj \ {e}). EFX is a stronger property than
EF1.
3. Given an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) and valuation functions f = {f1, . . . , fn}, the utility
vector is uA,f = (f1(A1), . . . , fn(An)), and the sorted utility vector sA,f is a vector whose
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entries are those of uA,f sorted from smallest to largest. We impose a lex-min order among
sorted vectors, where s1 >lexmin s2 if there is some k ∈ [n] such that s1(k) > s2(k) and
for every 1 ≤ j < k we have that s1(j) = s2(j). Given the valuation functions f , an
allocation A is maximal in the lex-min order if for every other allocation A′ we have that
sA,f ≥lexmin sA′,f . We refer to such an allocation as a lex-min allocation. Given f , a
lex-min allocation always exists (as the set of allocations is finite).
4. Using notation as above, we also impose a Lorenz domination partial order over sorted
vectors, where s1 ≥Lorenz s2 if for every k ∈ [n], the sum of first k entries in s1 is at
least as large as the sum of first k entries in s2. A Lorenz dominating allocation is an
allocation that Lorenz dominates every other allocation. Given the valuation functions f ,
a Lorenz dominating allocation need not exist, but if it does exist, then it is also a lex-min
allocation.
5. Given valuation functions f , an allocation A will be referred to as min-square if it
maximizes welfare (
∑
i fi(Ai)), and conditioned on maximizing welfare, it minimizes∑
i(fi(Ai))
2. A min-square allocation always exists. It is an allocation that minimizes the
variance of utilities among players, conditioned on maximizing the welfare.
6. Given valuation functions f , an allocation A is said to maximize the Nash Social Welfare
(NSW) if it maximizes the product
∏
i fi(Ai). (Formally, such an allocation maximizes
NSW relative to the disagreement point of not allocating any item.) Given f , a maximum
NSW allocation always exist, though it need not maximize welfare.
Each of the notions of maximin share, EF1 and EFX can be relaxed to hold only up to an
multiplicative term of α ∈ [0, 1], and we use the notation α-maximin, α-EF1 and α-EFX
to denote these approximate fairness notions in which a player get at least α-fraction of the
appropriate share (see Section A in the appendix for formal definitions).
3 Submodular Dichotomous Valuations
In this section we consider valuation functions that are both dichotomous and submodular. It is
known (follows from the matroid exchange property) that a function is submodular dichotomous
if and only if it is a rank function of a matroid. Consequently, for brevity, we shall refer to
submodular dichotomous valuations as MRFs (Matroid Rank Functions).
In this section we prove our first main result:
Theorem 3 There exists an allocation mechanism for players with MRF valuations with the
following properties:
1. For players with MRF valuations, being truthful is a dominant strategy.
2. When players are truthful the allocation is welfare maximizing.
3. When players are truthful, the allocation of the mechanism is a Lorenz dominating allo-
cation, it is lex-min, it is min-square, and maximizes NSW. It is also EFX (and hence
also EF1). If furthermore, the valuations are additive dichotomous, the allocation is also
maximin fair.
4. If the players have MRF valuations with succinct representations, then the mechanism can
be implemented in polynomial time.
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One aspect of the proof of the theorem involves showing that a Lorenz dominating allocation
exists. Lorenz domination can be shown to imply the desired welfare and fairness properties.
However, simply picking an arbitrary Lorenz dominating allocation does not guarantee truth-
fulness (see Example 4). Hence a major part of the proof of the theorem is to show that a
particular choice of a Lorenz dominating solution does ensure truthfulness.
Example 4 Consider a setting with items a1 and a2, and players p1, p2 and p3, with additive
dichotomous valuations, where every player wants all items. Every allocation in which two of
the players get an item each is a Lorenz dominating allocation. Consider a mechanism that for
i ∈ {1, 2} gives item ai to player pi, unless player p3 reports that she desires only a1, and in
this case p3 rather than p1 gets a1. This mechanism only picks Lorenz dominating allocations,
but is not truthful (p3 can gain by concealing the fact that she also desires a2).
3.1 Lorenz Dominating Allocations
The following proposition puts together several observations regarding fairness properties of
Lorenz dominating allocations, most (if not all) of which are known.
Proposition 5 Given any (normalized and monotone) valuation functions f = (f1, . . . , fn), a
Lorenz dominating allocation, if it exists, also maximizes welfare, is lex-min, is min-square, and
maximizes NSW. If moreover the valuation functions are MRFs, a Lorenz dominating alloca-
tion that is non-redundant (see definition of non-redundant in Section 2.2) is also EFX (and
hence also EF1). If furthermore, the valuations are additive dichotomous, a Lorenz dominating
allocation is also maximin fair.
For MRF valuations Lorenz dominating allocations might not be maximin fair, but are
approximately so.
Proposition 6 There are MRF valuation functions with respect to which no Lorenz dominating
allocation is maximin fair. For every collection of MRF valuation functions, in every Lorenz
dominating allocation every player gets at least half her maximin share.
In view of Propositions 5 and 6, we choose Lorenz domination as our fairness requirement.
As we shall see in Theorem 7, in our setting of MRF valuations, a Lorenz dominating allocation
always exists, and often, more than one such allocation exists. For example, if there is only
one item and all players desire it, then allocating the item to any of the players is a Lorenz
dominating allocation. We now wish to address truthfulness of the allocation mechanism. This
will be achieved by implementing a particular choice among Lorenz dominating allocations.
This choice will be guided by two principles.
The first principle is that the allocation will be non-redundant. Namely, for every player,
the allocation is such that the set of items given to the player does not contain redundant items
that give the player no marginal value. In our setting, this is equivalent to requiring that the
set of items received by a player forms an independent set in the matroid underlying the MRF
of the player.
The second principle is that of imposing some arbitrary priority order among the players,
fixed independently of their valuations. Among the possibly many Lorenz-dominating alloca-
tions that may exist, we choose one that favors the higher priority players as much as possible.
Still, there may be several different allocations that satisfy this condition, but any two of them
will be equivalent in terms of the utilities that the players (who have MRF valuation functions)
derive from them.
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W.l.o.g., let the priority order be such that player i has priority i (player 1 has highest
priority, player n has lowest priority). A convenient mathematical way to reason about the
priority order is as follows. Add to the instance n auxiliary items a1, . . . , an. For every player
i ∈ [n], pretend that the marginal value of item ai is in2 to player i (regardless of any other items
that player i may hold), and the marginal value of aj with j 6= i is 0. With the auxiliary items,
the new valuations f ′ = (f ′1, . . . , f
′
n) of players satisfy f
′
i(S) = fi(S ∩M) + in2 |S ∩ {ai}|. They
are not MRFs (because the marginals of auxiliary items are not in {0, 1}), but they are still
gross substitutes (because each f ′i is a sum of a gross substitute function fi on the original items
and a gross substitute function on the auxiliary items). In every welfare maximizing allocation,
for every i ∈ [n], item ai is given to player i. Given the auxiliary item, when allocating the
original items, a Lorenz dominating allocation will break ties in favor of higher priority players,
as they derive less value from the auxiliary items.
Theorem 7 Given MRF valuations f = (f1, . . . , fn) and the auxiliary items (giving rise to
new valuations f ′ = (f ′1, . . . , f
′
n)), there is a Lorenz dominating allocation A
′. Moreover there
is a unique vector of utilities (the vector uA′,f ′ = (f
′
1(A
′
1), . . . , f
′
n(A
′
n)) shared by all Lorenz
dominating allocations. Removing the auxiliary items from the Lorenz dominating allocation
results in an allocation A that is Lorenz dominating with respect to the original MRF valuations.
Proof. Consider the following function W that we shall refer to as a welfare function. Given a
set M of indivisible items, a set V of n agents, and valuation functions f1, . . . , fn, the function
W is a set function defined over the players. Given a set S ⊆ V , W (S) is the maximum welfare
attainable by the set S. Namely, W (S) = maxA=(A1,...,An)[
∑
i∈S fi(Ai)]. Lemma 19 shows
that given our valuation functions f ′ = (f ′1, . . . , f
′
n) (the MRFs, augmented with the auxiliary
items), the respective welfare function W is submodular. Dutta and Ray [27] prove that if W
is submodular, then a Lorenz dominating allocation exists. Consequently, with our valuation
functions f ′, a Lorenz dominating allocation A′ exists.
Uniqueness of the vector of utilities is a consequence of the fact that with the auxiliary items,
the utility of a player uniquely identifies the player. Consequently, any two different vectors of
utilities give two different sorted vectors. The sorted vector of a Lorenz dominating allocation is
unique (by definition of the Lorenz domination partial order), and hence the (unsorted) vector
is also unique.
Removing the auxiliary items from a Lorenz dominating allocation A′ gives an allocation
A that is Lorenz dominating with respect to the original MRF valuations f . For the sake of
contradiction, suppose otherwise, that there is some allocation B such that A does not Lorenz
dominate B. Then there is some k ≤ n such that the sum of the first k terms of the sorted
vector of B is larger than the sum of the first k terms of the sorted vector of A. As the values
of both sums are integer, the difference between the two sums is at least 1. Consequently, even
A′ does not Lorenz dominate B, because the total contribution of auxiliary items is at most∑n
i=1
i
n2
< 1, contradicting the assumption that A′ was Lorenz dominating with respect to f ′.

3.2 The Prioritized Egalitarian (PE) Mechanism
We can now present our allocation mechanism for MRF valuations, that we refer to as the
prioritized egalitarian (PE) mechanism. We assume for this purpose that each MRF fi has
a succinct representation (of size polynomial in the number m of items) such that given this
representation, for every S one may compute fi(S) (answer value queries) in time polynomial
in m.
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1. The mechanism imposes an arbitrary priority order σ among the agents. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we assume that the order is from 1 to n, where player 1
has highest priority.
2. Every player is requested to report his MRF to the mechanism. A report that is not an
MRF (or failure to provide a report at all) is considered illegal, and is replaced by the
MRF that is identically 0 (and consequently, the non-redundant allocation will not give
such a player any item).
3. Given the reported MRF valuation functions r1, . . . , rn, the mechanism computes a non-
redundant Lorenz dominating allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) with respect to these reports
and σ (as implied by Theorem 7), and gives each player i the respective set Ai.
We now show that the PE mechanism is truthful. For this we introduce some notation.
Given a valuation function fi and a set D of items, we use fi|D to denote the function fi
restricted to the items of D. Namely, for every set S, fi|D(S) = fi(S ∩D). We note that if fi is
an MRF, then so is fi|D. Truthfulness will be a consequence of the following properties of the
allocation mechanism.
• We say that an allocation mechanism is faithful if the following holds for every collection
f = (f1, . . . , fn) of valuation functions and for every player i. Let Ai denote the allocation
of the mechanism to player i when the reported valuation functions are f . Then if instead
player i reports valuation function fi|Ai (and the reports of the other players remain un-
changed), then the allocation to player i remains Ai. We say that an allocation mechanism
is strongly faithful if it is faithful, and in addition, for every set A′ ⊂ Ai, if player i reports
valuation function fi|A′ (and the reports of the other players remain unchanged), then the
allocation to player i becomes A′.
• We say that an allocation mechanism is monotone if the following holds for every collection
f = (f1, . . . , fn) of valuation functions, every player i, and every two sets of items S and
T with S ⊂ T . Let Ai|S denote the allocation of the mechanism to player i when the
reported valuation function for player i is fi|S and the remaining reports are as in f .
Then if instead player i reports a legal (see remark that follows) valuation function fi|T
(and the remaining reports remain unchanged), then the allocation Ai|T to player i satisfies
fi(Ai|T ) ≥ fi(Ai|S). (Remark. It may happen that fi is not an MRF, fi|T is not an MRF,
but fi|S happens to be an MRF. In this case the PE mechanism might produce a nonempty
Ai|S and an empty Ai|T , violating the inequality fi(Ai|T ) ≥ fi(Ai|S). For this reason we do
not impose the monotonicity condition if the valuation function fi|T is illegal with respect
to the underlying allocation mechanism.)
We next prove that the PE mechanism is truthful. Some of the claims used in the proof are
presented and proved in the appendix.
Theorem 8 The PE mechanism is truthful for players with MRF valuations. Namely, for every
player with an MRF valuation, reporting her true valuation function maximizes her utility, for
any reports of the other players.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary player v. Fix the reported valuation functions of all other players.
All these reported valuation functions can be assumed to be MRFs, because the PE mechanism
replaces every non-MRF reported function by the all 0 MRF. Let fv be the MRF valuation of
v. Let Av denote the set of items that v receives when reporting fv. Suppose now that instead
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v reports a different valuation function f ′v 6= fv, and receives an allocation A′v. We need to show
that fv(Av) ≥ fv(A′v).
We may assume that f ′v is an MRF, as otherwise v gets no item and fv(Av) ≥ 0 = fv(∅).
Change the report f ′v to f
′
v|A′v
. By faithfulness (Proposition 20) the allocation to v remains
A′v. Let B ⊆ A′v be a subset of smallest cardinality for which fv(B) = fv(A′v). Necessarily,
|B| = fv(A′v) = fv(B), and B is a maximum size subset of A′v that is independent with
respect to the matroid underlying fv. Change the report f
′
v|A′v
to f ′v|B. By strong faithfulness
(Lemma 22) the allocation to v becomes B. Now change the report f ′v|B to fv|B . This changes
nothing because as functions f ′v|B = fv|B (both f
′
v and fv give value 1 to items of B, value 0
to other items, and are additive over B – for f ′v additivity follows because the allocation is
non-redundant, and for fv because B was chosen to be an independent set of the matroid), and
hence the allocation to v remains B. Finally, change the report fv|B to fv. By monotonicity
(Lemma 21), the resulting allocation to v (which is now simply Av) has value to v at least as
high as B does. We conclude that fv(Av) ≥ fv(B) = fv(A′v), as desired. 
Finally, we prove that the PE mechanism can be computed efficiently.
Theorem 9 If the players have MRF valuations with succinct representations, then the PE
mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time.
3.3 Best-of-Both-Worlds via Random Priorities
We have presented the PE mechanism that is truthful, welfare maximizing and EFX (among
other fairness properties). Yet, as this is a deterministic mechanism, it cannot be envy-free
(deterministic envy freeness is clearly impossible: consider a single desired item and two agents).
In this section we show that envy can be eliminated (ex-ante) by running the PE mechanism
with uniformly random priorities, and that this holds even if agents are not risk neutral.
The random priority egalitarian (RPE) mechanism is the mechanism that first assigns the
agents priorities uniformly at random, and then runs the PE allocation mechanism with the
drawn priorities. This mechanism is universally truthful (truthful for any realization of the
random priorities), welfare maximizing and obtains all the fairness properties of the PE mech-
anism ex-post. Moreover, as we next show, it is also stochastically envy free. This establishes
a best-of-both-worlds result: both stochastic envy freeness of the randomized allocation, and
EFX (among other fairness properties) ex-post.
For given valuation functions (v1, v2, . . . , vn), a distribution over allocations is stochastically
envy free if for every two agents i and j, and for every value t,
Pr[vi(A(i)) ≥ t] ≥ Pr[vi(A(j)) ≥ t],
where the probability is taken over the choice of random allocation according to the given
distribution.
We note that this notion of stochastic envy-freeness implies ex-ante envy-freeness, that is,
it implies E[vi(Ai)] ≥ E[vi(Aj)], but it is stronger (see Example 44), and it implies that for
any risk attitude, and not only when an agent is risk neutral, he prefers his own lottery over
the lottery of any other agent (e.g., he can be risk seeking or risk averse). Additionally, note
that any ex-ante envy-free mechanism that is not wasteful (i.e., for each agent, the marginal
value of the set on unallocated items is always zero) is also ex-ante proportional for subadditive
valuations (Observation 41).
We next present our result for the RPE mechanism, showing that it obtains the ”best-of-
both-worlds”: it is universally truthful, welfare maximizing and stochastically envy-free as well
as EFX ex-post. This result does not require agents to be neutral to risk.
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Theorem 10 The random priority egalitarian (RPE) mechanism has the following properties
when players have submodular dichotomous valuations:
1. Being truthful is a dominant strategy for any realization of the priorities (universally
truthful).
2. When players are truthful the realized allocation is welfare maximizing.
3. When players are truthful, the realized allocation of the mechanism is a Lorenz dominating
allocation, and consequently it enjoys additional fairness properties, including maximizing
Nash social welfare, and being envy-free up to any item (EFX). If furthermore, the val-
uations are additive dichotomous, the allocation gives every player at least her maximin
share.
4. The mechanism is stochastically envy-free, and thus is ex-ante envy free as well as ex-ante
proportional.
The proof of Theorem 10 is deferred to Appendix E.
4 ǫ-Leveled Valuations
We have shown (Theorem 3) that for submodular dichotomous (MRF) valuations there is a
deterministic truthful allocation mechanism that always outputs welfare maximizing allocations
that is Lorentz dominating and thus satisfies multiple fairness properties. In this section we
want to explore the robustness of this result, by examining the extent to which we can relax
the assumption that the marginal value of any item with respect to any set is either exactly 0
or exactly 1. A natural relaxation of this assumption is to allow marginals to be almost those
values. It turns out the result for MRF valuations is not sensitive to undesired items having
negative utility instead of 0, so we focus on relaxing the assumption that positive marginals
must be 1, and instead allow the positive marginals to be in [1, 1 + ǫ], allowing a player not to
be indifferent between desired items. This is the case of ǫ-dichotomous valuations in which the
marginal value of every item is either 0 or in [1, 1 + ǫ].
While our prioritized egalitarian mechanism presented in Section 3 for MRF valuations
maximizes welfare, it is easy to see that once we allow desired items to have different values, no
truthful allocation mechanism will be welfare maximizing. (If the mechanism always maximizes
welfare, it is easy to construct examples where players have incentives to report a value of
1 + ǫ for items that they value at 1.) Nevertheless, as valuations are ǫ-dichotomous, reasonable
allocations have maximal size and almost maximize welfare (getting at least 11+ǫ fraction), see
Observation 25, so we aim for a truthful mechanism that always outputs an allocation with
welfare at least 11+ǫ fraction of the maximum welfare. We call such an allocation approximately
welfare maximizing.
Unfortunately, for ǫ-dichotomous players, truthfulness and the requirement to output ap-
proximately welfare maximizing allocations are at odds, even when allowing randomized mecha-
nisms. Indeed, the following example shows that for every ǫ > 0 there is no truthful mechanism
(deterministic or randomized7) that always returns an approximately welfare maximizing allo-
cation for ǫ-dichotomous submodular valuations (that are unit demand, not additive).
Example 11 Let the set of items be M = {L,H}, and there are two players with ǫ-dichotomous
valuations. Both players 1, 2 are unit demand with identical valuation function f satisfying
7For randomized mechanism the example is such that a lie stochastically dominates the truth.
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f(L) = 1, f(H) = 1+ǫ (both players slightly prefer the high value item H over the low value item
L). When both agents report their true valuation, at least one of them has positive probability
of not getting item H. W.l.o.g., let player 1 be that player. If player 1 reports a valuation
f1(L) = 0, f1(H) = 1 + ǫ (that is, that he does not want the low value item at all), and player
2 reports truthfully, the only approximately welfare maximizing allocation is the one in which
agent 1 receives item H (and agent 2 gets L) and therefore agent 1 gets higher utility by lying.
Given Example 11 above it is clear we could not achieve the desired properties for ǫ-
dichotomous valuations, so we consider the problem of designing a truthful and approximately
welfare maximizing mechanism only for the more restricted class of ǫ-dichotomous additive valu-
ations (ǫ-leveled valuations). A truthful mechanism that always outputs approximately welfare
maximizing allocations for ǫ-leveled valuations indeed exists: order the players arbitrarily and
allow each player in turn to pick all items he desires out of the remaining items. Yet, this
mechanism is clearly very unfair, as if the first player desires all items, he will take all items
and other players will get nothing. Thus, we ask whether there exists a deterministic truthful
allocation mechanism for ǫ-leveled players that always outputs approximately welfare maximiz-
ing allocations and is fair. Unfortunately, we show that even with two players and three items,
there does not exist such a deterministic mechanism that satisfies the following minimal fairness
property: if a player desires two items, he gets at least one of them. This precludes a mechanism
that satisfies any of our fairness properties (e.g., maximin fair, EF1).
Proposition 12 There is no deterministic truthful allocation mechanism for allocating three
items to two ǫ-leveled players that always outputs approximately welfare maximizing allocations,
and in case that a player desires two items, he gets at least one of them.
We remark that Amanatidis et al. [3] present impossibility results concerning fair allocation
mechanisms for two players with additive valuations, but the setting of Proposition 12 is not
captured by these results, as it restricts players to be ǫ-leveled, and not just additive.
Given this negative result for deterministic mechanisms, we will consider randomized mech-
anisms. We aim for a mechanism that is truthful in expectation (over the randomization of the
mechanism), is approximately welfare maximizing, and is as fair as possible (ex-post, for any
realization). Clearly such a mechanism that always outputs a Lorentz dominating allocation
does not exist (as such an allocation might not exist8), yet, maybe a Lorentz dominating allo-
cation exists when rounding down the value of every set to the nearest integer (essentially only
counting the number of desired items in the set)?
We first formalize the notation of rounding down a valuation function. Given a function f ,
we define fˆ to be the floor of f as follows:
fˆ(S) = ⌊f(S)⌋ ∀S ⊆M. (1)
We observe that such a rounding does not change the value of any set by much:
Observation 13 For non-negative ǫ < 1m , and any ǫ-dichotomous valuation f , the floor func-
tion fˆ is dichotomous and for every set S ⊆M ,
f(S) ≤ (1 + ǫ)fˆ(S). (2)
Additionally, if f is ǫ-leveled then the function fˆ is dichotomous and additive.
8Consider two items and two players. The first player has value 1+ ǫ for each item, while the second has value
1 for each item. A Lorentz dominating allocation, if exists, must be welfare maximizing and must also maximize
the NSW (by Proposition 5), yet clearly the first requires both items to got to the first player, while the second
require dividing the items between the two.
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As moving from ǫ-dichotomous valuations to their floors only results with very small changes
to the valuations (up to a multiplicative term of (1 + ǫ), by Equation (2)), one may hope that
mechanisms that achieve some fairness properties for dichotomous valuations, also have these
properties holding approximately when they run on the floor valuations. As Lorentz dominat-
ing allocations have many desired fairness properties (recall Proposition 5) it would be most
attractive to show that there exist randomized truthful in expectation allocation mechanism for
ǫ-leveled players that for any valuations f always outputs a Lorentz dominating allocation with
respect to fˆ . Unfortunately, this is not achievable as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 14 Consider any of the following fairness properties: being Lorentz dominating,
being min-square, maximizing NSW, being lex-min, being EFX. Every randomized truthful in
expectation allocation mechanism for allocating two items to two ǫ-leveled players either some-
times fails to satisfy this property ex-post, even with respect to fˆ , or sometimes fails to be
reasonable (fails to allocate a demanded item to some player who demands it).
Given this negative result, the fairness properties that we can hope the mechanism could
achieve are EF1 and maximin fairness. Moreover, as the mechanisms we consider are ran-
domized, we can hope to also get proportionality in expectation (clearly it cannot be obtained
ex-post). Recall that S gives player v his proportional share if fv(S) ≥ fv(M)/n. An allocation
A = (A1, . . . , An) is proportional if fv(Av) ≥ fv(M)/n for every player v, and a randomized
mechanism is proportional in expectation if for every player, the expected value of the allocation
to the player is at least fv(M)/n when truthful.
In light of the above, we aim to design a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expec-
tation for ǫ-leveled valuations, always outputs approximately welfare maximizing allocations, is
EF1 and maximin fair with respect to the floor valuations fˆ , and is proportional in expectation
(for f). Note that EF1 and maximin fair with respect to the floor valuations fˆ implies that
the corresponding inequality holds, up to a small multiplicative loss, with respect to the actual
valuations f (e.g., for maximin, the player is getting at least 11+ǫ -fraction of the maximin share).
We emphasize that we are aiming for exact truthfulness and we are not satisfied with mech-
anisms for which truth telling is only approximately best9. We next present a mechanism that
achieves all these properties.
The mechanism we design will work on the floor valuations, or equivalently, ask players for
the set of items they desire (have value in [1, 1+ ǫ]), and not try to elicit the exact value of each
item. This approach allows using mechanisms designed for dichotomous valuations to work for
ǫ-dichotomous valuations. Given a mechanism M for dichotomous valuations we denote by Mˆ
the mechanism for ǫ-dichotomous valuations such that Mˆ(f) = M(fˆ) for ǫ < 1m . It is easy
to see that if M gives each truthful player with dichotomous valuations his maximin share,
then Mˆ gives each truthful player with ǫ-dichotomous valuation at least 11+ǫ -fraction of his
maximin share (and similarly, the inequalities defining EF1 and EFX approximately hold, see
Observation 24).
4.1 A Truthful Mechanism for Leveled Valuations
In this section, we present a truthful10 in expectation allocation mechanism for ǫ-leveled valu-
ations (for small enough ǫ > 0). Recall that an ǫ-leveled valuation is an additive valuation in
9By Observation 24 we get that ifM is truthful for dichotomous players then Mˆ is ǫ-truthful for ǫ-dichotomous
valuations.
10We are slightly abusing the notion of truthfulness here, as the players are not asked to directly report their ǫ-
leveled valuations. Rather, each player is only being asked to report the set of items he demands (which describes
an additive dichotomous valuations), and we say that an agent is “truthful” if he reports that set truthfully.
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which the marginal value of every item is either in [1, 1 + ǫ], or is zero11. We prove that when
agents are truthful, the allocation is reasonable (and thus approximately welfare maximizing)
and satisfies several notions of fairness. It is 11+ǫ -maximin fair and
1
1+ǫ -EF1 (both are ex-post
notions, giving a fairness guarantee for every realization of the randomness of the mechanism).
Also, every player gets his proportional share in expectation.
The problem in using the prioritized egalitarian mechanism when players have ǫ-leveled
valuations is that it is no longer truthful (as implied by Proposition 12). Yet, the mecha-
nism is ǫ-truthful, meaning that a truthful player loses only a small fraction of his value due
to being truthful. We suggest a (rather general) randomized method, based on combining an
almost-truthful reasonable mechanism with another simple deterministic mechanism that allo-
cates either one or two random items to players with random priorities, and using the original
mechanism only on the remaining items, to obtain a truthful in expectation mechanism. Cru-
cially, the second mechanism will create a strict incentive (that is large enough) to be truthful,
to overcome the loss of a truthful player in the prioritized egalitarian mechanism.
More specifically, we pick one or two random items to leave out and run the prioritized
egalitarian mechanism with random priorities over players. We then run the additional mecha-
nism with reverse priority order, on the set of items left aside, only allocating items to players
demanding them, and not allocating the second item to the player that got the first, if possi-
ble. The fact that we only allocate to players demanded items creates an incentive to not hide
demanded items, while the possibility of getting the first item in the expense of the second,
creates incentive not to add undesired items. We show that when ǫ is small enough, the com-
bined mechanism will be truthful in expectation. Additionally, it will satisfy several important
fairness properties (the reversal of the priority order in the second mechanism is crucial for
that). With this high-level description in mind, we move to formally describe the mechanism.
We first introduce a deterministic truthful and reasonable allocation mechanism MX that
given a list of items X (consisting of 1 or 2 items), priority order σ over the players, and a
reported demanded set Rv for every player v, returns an allocation A
X as follows:
1. If there is player v with X[1] ∈ Rv, then allocate X[1] to the highest priority player v
such that X[1] ∈ Rv, and move v to have the lowest priority.
2. If |X| > 1 and X[2] ∈ Rv for some v, then allocate X[2] to highest priority player v such
that X[2] ∈ Rv.
Proposition 15 For players that have additive dichotomous valuations, MX is reasonable,
truthful, EF1, and moreover, a player never envies a player that has lower priority than him.
We now present a truthful in expectation randomized allocation mechanismML for settings
where all players valuations are ǫ-leveled for ǫ < 1
nm3
. Let MB be the prioritized egalitarian
(PE) mechanism described in Section 3 for MRF valuations (we will use it for the special case
of additive dichotomous valuations.) Let ML be the following mechanism:
1. Each agent v is asked to report a set Rv, of the items he demands.
2. Pick an item x uniformly at random from M , and let X[1] = x.
3. With probability 1− 1m pick an item y 6= x uniformly at random and set X[2] = y.
4. Let σ be a random order of priorities over the players.
11Actually, the truthfulness result we present can be extended to the case that instead of zero marginals we
allow any non-positive marginals (allowing for non-monotone valuations).
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5. Let AB be the allocation of MB and players ordered by σ, and the reported sets Rv \X
for each player v. 12
6. Let AX be the allocation ofMX with the set of itemsX and players ordered by reverse(σ),
and the reported sets Rv ∩X for each player v.
7. Return A where Av = A
B
v ∪AXv for every player v.
We use the properties of MB and of MX to prove that mechanism ML satisfies multiple
desired properties (for the proof see Appendix C.3).
Theorem 16 When all players are ǫ-leveled for ǫ < 1
nm3
mechanism ML has the following
properties:
1. ML is a truthful in expectation mechanism. I.e., each player maximizes his expected value
(over the randomization of the mechanism) by reporting the set of items he demands truth-
fully, for any reports of the others.13 Additionally, the mechanism is ex-post ǫ-truthful.
2. ML is reasonable. Thus the welfare ex-post is at least 11+ǫ -fraction of the maximum
welfare, when players are truthful.
3. ML guarantees every truthful agent his 11+ǫ -maximin share. Additionally, ML is 11+ǫ -EF1
for truthful agents.
4. Each truthful player receives his proportional share in expectation.14
5. ML can be implemented in polynomial time in the number of items and agents.
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A Approximate truthfulness and approximate fairness notions
Each of the notions of maximin share, EF, EF1 and EFX can be relaxed to hold only up to an
multiplicative term of α. We next formally defined those notions.
For a given valuations functions f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) and α ∈ [0, 1]:
• An allocation A is α-maximin fair if fv(Av) is at least α fraction of his maximin share for
every player v ∈ V . We use α-maximin(fv) to denote this share.
• An allocation A is α-EF if for every v1, v2 ∈ V fv1(Av1) ≥ α · fv1(Av2).
• An allocation A is α-EF1 if for every v1, v2 ∈ V such that Av2 is not empty there exist
an item a ∈ Av2 such that fv1(Av1) ≥ α · fv1(Av2 \ {a}).
• An allocation A is α-EFX if for every v1, v2 ∈ V and for every a ∈ Av2 it holds that
fv1(Av1) ≥ α · fv1(Av2 \ {a}).
• A mechanism M is ǫ-truthful if for every player v with valuation fv and any reports of
the other players f−v, and any report f
′
v of v, it holds that
(1 + ǫ)fv(M(fv , f−v)v) ≥ fv(M(f ′v , f−v)v).
I.e., player v can only increase his value by at most a multiplicative factor of 1 + ǫ by
being non-truthful.
B Missing proofs for MRF Valuations
B.1 Fairness Properties of Lorenz Dominating Allocations
We next restate and prove Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Given any (normalized and monotone) valuation functions f = (f1, . . . , fn), a
Lorenz dominating allocation, if it exists, also maximizes welfare, is lex-min, is min-square, and
maximizes NSW. If moreover the valuation functions are MRFs, a Lorenz dominating alloca-
tion that is non-redundant (see definition of non-redundant in Section 2.2) is also EFX (and
hence also EF1). If furthermore, the valuations are additive dichotomous, a Lorenz dominating
allocation is also maximin fair.
Proof. Let f = (f1, . . . , fn) denote the valuation functions of the players, and suppose that
A = (A1, . . . , An) is a Lorenz dominating allocation.
1. Let A′ be an allocation that maximizes welfare. Then for the sorted utility vectors,
sA,f ≥Lorenz sA′,f implies (by taking k = n) that
∑n
i=1 fi(Ai) ≥
∑n
i=1 fi(A
′
i). Conse-
quently, A maximizes welfare.
2. Allocation A is also a lexmin allocation, because for every allocation A′, the inequality
sA,f ≥lexmin sA′,f is implied by sA,f ≥Lorenz sA′,f .
3. Allocation A can be shown to maximize NSW by considering the entries of sA,f in a forward
order, and using concavity of the product function
∏
i xi (for non-negative variables).
4. Allocation A maximizes welfare (as required by min-square allocations), and can be shown
to be min-square by considering the entries of sA,f in a backward order, and using con-
vexity of the min-square function
∑
i(xi)
2.
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Suppose now that the valuations are MRFs and that the Lorenz dominating allocation is
non-redundant. In this case, we prove that the allocation is EFX. Let i, j ∈ [n] be such that i
envies j, that is fi(Aj) > fi(Ai). By the non-redundancy property we have that fi(Ai) = |Ai|.
If |Aj | ≤ |Ai| + 1, then the EFX condition holds. Hence suppose for the sake of contradiction
that |Aj | ≥ |Ai|+2. By the non-redundancy property we have that fj(Aj) = |Aj | ≥ fi(Ai)+ 2.
By the matroid exchange property of MRFs it follows that there is an item e ∈ Aj such that
fi(Ai ∪ {e}) = fi(Ai) + 1 (and fj(Aj \ {e}) = fj(Aj) − 1). Moving item e from player j to
player i gives an allocation that Lorenz dominates A, thus contradicting the assumption that
|Aj | ≥ |Ai|+ 2.
Finally, suppose that the valuations are additive dichotomous. In this case, we prove that
any Lorenz dominating allocation A is maximin fair. Let Dv be the set of demand items for
player v. The maximin share of v is t =
⌊
|Dv|
n
⌋
. Assume for the sake of contradiction that v
receives at most t − 1 items from Dv . As A is welfare maximizing, all of Dv is allocated, and
items in Dv are only allocated to players that demand these items. Hence some other player,
say u, receives at least t + 1 items from Dv, and has utility at least t + 1. Moving one such
item from u to v results in an allocation that Lorenz dominates A. As no allocation can Lorenz
dominate the Lorenz dominating allocation A, it must be that v receives at least his maximin
share. 
We next restate and prove Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 There are MRF valuation functions with respect to which no Lorenz dominating
allocation is maximin fair. For every collection of MRF valuation functions, in every Lorenz
dominating allocation every player gets at least half her maximin share.
Proof. Consider a set M of m = (2n−1)n items that is partitioned into two sets: a set G with
(n−1)n items and a set B with n2 items. Define the MRF f1 as f1(S) = |S∩G|+min[|S∩B|, n].
For 2 ≤ j ≤ n, define the MRF fj as fj(S) = |S ∩G|. The maximin share of player 1 is 2n− 1
(partitionM into n bundles, each containing n−1 items from G and n items from B). However,
every Lorenz dominating allocation gives each player n items (player 1 gets n items from B, and
the other players each get n items from G). Hence Lorenz domination does not imply maximin
fairness.
Now let f = {f1, . . . , fn} be a collection of arbitrary MRF valuation functions and let
A = {A1, . . . , An} be an arbitrary Lorenz dominating allocation. Suppose that the maximin
share of player 1 is t. This means that there is a partition of the items into n bundles (S1, . . . , Sn),
with f1(Sj) ≥ t for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Denote f1(A1) by t′, and suppose for the sake of contradiction
that t′ < t2 . Then the matroid exchange property implies that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the set Sj
contains at least t− t′ ≥ t′ + 1 distinct items such that each one of them has marginal value 1
to f1 with respect to A1. Call these items valuable and note that the total number of valuable
items is at least n(t′+1). No player i 6= 1 can hold more than t′+1 valuable items, as the Lorenz
dominating allocation would transfer such an item from player i to player 1. Hence there are at
most (n− 1)(t′+1) valuable items allocated to other players, which implies that some valuable
item remains unallocated. This contradicts the assumption that A is Lorenz dominating. 
B.2 Missing proofs from Section 3.1
In the proof of Theorem 7 we made use of Lemma 19. Before proving that Lemma, we introduce
a key lemma that will serve us in several of our proofs. The lemma basically shows that we can
move from one allocation closer (with respect to utilities) to the other, by “moving an item”
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from a player that got too much, to one that got too little. The item that one player lost might
not be the same as the item another player gains, and in the process we might need to exchange
some items between the players.
Lemma 17 Let f = (f1, . . . , fn) be MRF valuations, and let A = (A0, A1, . . . , An) and B =
(B0, B1, . . . , Bn) be two non-redundant allocations, where A0 and B0 specify the sets of items that
remain unallocated. Let S+ ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n} be the set of those indices j for which |Aj | > |Bj|,
let S− be the set of indices j for which |Aj | < |Bj|, and let S= be the set of indices j for which
|Aj | = |Bj |. Suppose that S− \ {0} is not empty (consequently also S+ is not empty), and let
i be a player with i ∈ S−. Then there is a non-redundant allocation C = (C0, C1, . . . , Cn) with
the following properties:
1. |Ci| = |Ai|+ 1.
2. There is precisely one index k ∈ S+ for which |Ck| = |Ak| − 1.
3. For every j 6∈ {i, k} it holds that |Cj | = |Aj|.
4. For every j ∈ S+ it holds that Cj ⊆ Aj (with set equality unless j = k).
Before proving the lemma, let us provide some intuition. Consider three players p1, p2, p3
and two items e1, e2, where players have additive dichotomous valuations, p1 desires only e1, and
p2 and p3 both desire both items. We consider allocations that leave no item unallocated. Let
A = (A1, A2, A3) = (φ, {e1}, {e2}) and B = (B1, B2, B3) = ({e1}, {e2}, φ). Then S+ = {p3},
S= = {p2} and S− = {p1}. Hence only p1 can serve as i in Lemma 17, only p3 can serve as k,
and only B can serve as C (by simple case analysis.) Observe that transforming A to C = B
involves not only p3 giving up an item and p1 receiving an item, but also p2 exchanging an item.
In general, when valuation functions are additive dichotomous, it can be shown that trans-
forming from A to C as required by Lemma 17 can be achieved by player i gaining an item,
player k losing an item, and any other player in S− ∪ S= exchanging at most one of his items.
However, when valuations are submodular dichotomous (MRF), this is no longer true.
Consider four players p1, p2, p3, p4 and four items e1, e2, e3, e4. Players p1, p3 and p4 have
additive dichotomous valuations, p1 desires only e1, p4 desires only e4, and p3 desires items e2
and e3. The valuation function f2 of p2 is MRF, with f2(S) = |S ∩ {1, 3}| +min[1, |S ∩ {2, 4}|.
We consider allocations that leave no item unallocated. Let A = (φ, {e1, e2}, {e3}, {e4}) and
B = ({e1}, {e3, e4}, {e2}, φ). Then S+ = {p4}, S= = {p2, p3} and S− = {p1}. Hence only p1
can serve as i in Lemma 17, only p4 can serve as k, and only B can serve as C (by simple
case analysis, when observing that f2({e2, e4}) = 1 < 2). Transforming A to C = B involves
changing the allocation of all items. In particular, p2 exchanges both of his items.
We now proceed with the proof of Lemma 17.
Proof.(Lemma 17) For an item e, let A(e) denote the player that e is allocated to under A
(and 0 if e is not allocated), and let B(e) denote the player that e is allocated to under B.
Consider the following labeled directed (multi-) graph GA→B (it may have parallel edges)
with nodes v0, v1, . . . vn. For every item e, if B(e) 6= A(e) then place a directed edge (vA(e), vB(e))
and label it by e. Nodes in S− have higher in-degree than out-degree, nodes in S= have the same
in-degree as out-degree, and nodes in S+ have higher out-degree than in-degree. A directed
(not necessarily simple) path in the graph will simply be referred to as a path. A path will be
called legal if starting at allocation A and transfer those items that label the edges of the path
(each such item is transfered from the player who holds it under A to the player who holds it
under B) results in a non-redundant allocation. Recall that i ∈ S− and that S+ is nonempty.
A legal path will be called useful if it starts at S+ (let vk denote its starting vertex), then never
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visits S+ again, and ends at vi. A useful path must exist, by the following inductive argument
that constructs a useful path by starting at the end of the useful path (at an edge entering vi)
and working backwards towards the beginning of the path (to an edge leaving vk).
Start at vi. As vi ∈ S−, we have that |Bi| > |Ai|. The matroid exchange property implies
that there must be at least |Bi| − |Ai| different items such that if we transfer any of them from
the player holding it under A to player i, the allocation remains non-redundant. Choose one
such item e. (Remark. For the purpose of proving the lemma, e can be chosen arbitrarily.
However, when we use this Lemma in the proof of Lemma 22, we shall choose the item e in
a more careful way.) Item e necessarily labels an incoming edge into vi, say from vertex vj.
Transfer e from vj to vi (and include the edge labeled by e in the useful path). This changes
A into a new allocation A′. Now consider vj. If vj ∈ S+ we are done. Hence it remains to
address the case that vj 6∈ S+. For this we consider the labeled directed graph GA′→B, which
is obtained from GA→B by removing the edge labeled by e. Analogously to the definition with
respect to A, we now have new sets Sˆ+, Sˆ−, Sˆ= with respect to A′. Observe that vj ∈ Sˆ−
(because vj ∈ S= ∪ S− and it lost an item), that vi ∈ Sˆ= ∪ Sˆ− (because vi ∈ S− and it gained
an item), and all other players remain in their original sets (in particular, Sˆ+ = S+). Hence
now the argument can be repeated from vj ∈ Sˆ−. Eventually, we must reach a vertex in S+, as
the number of edges decreases in each iteration, and there always is at least one edge incident
with S+.
Doing all the transfers implied by the edges of the useful path gives the desired allocation
C. 
Given MRF valuation functions, consider the following greedy algorithm for generating an
allocation. Fix an arbitrary priority order among players, say from 1 to n, and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
let Si denote the set of the first i players. Each player in his turn is allocated the largest
possible number ni of items subject to the constraint that there is a non-redundant allocation
Ai = (Ai1, . . . , A
i
i) such that |Aij | = nj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ i. That is, player i gets the maximum
possible number of (non-redundant) items, subject to preserving the utilities of all players that
precede i.
Lemma 18 If players have MRF valuations, then for every i ∈ [n], the above greedy algorithm
gives an allocation that attains W (Si) (maximizes welfare for the set of first i players in the
priority order).
Proof. Given the priority order over players, let B be an allocation produced by the greedy
algorithm. Among all allocations that maximize welfare, let A be an allocation whose utility
vector (sorted according to the priority order) is lexicographically largest. We claim that A and
B have the same utility vector. For the sake of contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then by the
greedy choice of B, there must be an index ℓ such that for all i < ℓ we have |Ai| = |Bi|, and
|Aℓ| < |Bℓ|. Apply Lemma 17 with i = ℓ. This causes |Aℓ| to increase by one, and the player k
who loses an item must have index larger than ℓ (as {1, . . . , k− 1} ∈ S=). This contradicts the
choice of A as lexicographically largest. 
We can now prove Lemma 19 that was used in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 19 For the valuation function f ′ = (f ′1, . . . , f
′
n) defined above (MRFs augmented with
the auxiliary items), the respective welfare function W (defined in the proof of Theorem 7) is
submodular.
Proof. Let V denote the set of players. To show that W is submodular, we need to show that
for every set S ⊂ V and every two players u, v ⊂ V \S it holds thatW (S∪{u})+W (S∪{v}) ≥
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W (S) +W (S ∪ {u, v}). For the purpose of proving this inequality, we may ignore the auxiliary
items, as their contribution to the utility is additive, and hence they contribute equally to both
sides of the inequality.
Fix a priority order over S ∪ {u, v} such that players in S appear first, then u followed by
v. Apply the greedy algorithm on this order to find an allocation A = (AS , Au, Av) that attains
W (S∪{u, v}). By Lemma 18, the allocation AS attains W (S). As (AS , Au) is a non-redundant
allocation for S ∪ {u} and (AS , Av) is a non-redundant allocation for S ∪ {v} we get:
W (S ∪ {u}) +W (S ∪ {v}) ≥ (|AS |+ |Au|) + (|AS |+ |Av|)
= |AS |+ (|AS |+ |Au|+ |Av|)
= W (S) +W (S ∪ {u, v})
proving the corollary. 
B.3 Missing proofs from Section 3.2
Proposition 20 The PE mechanism is faithful.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be a non-redundant Lorenz dominating allocation under f =
(f1, . . . , fn). Replacing fi by fi|Ai does not enlarge the set of non-redundant allocation, and so
A remains Lorenz dominating. By Theorem 7, all Lorenz dominating allocations have the same
value vector, and hence player i must receive Ai in the new non-redundant Lorenz dominating
allocation. 
Lemma 21 The PE mechanism is monotone.
Proof. Fix the valuation functions f = (f1, . . . , fn), a player p, and two sets of items S and
T with S ⊂ T . Every player j 6= p reports fj. Let A be the allocation output by the PE
mechanism when player p reports fp|S, and let B be the allocation when player p reports fp|T .
To prove monotonicity in general, we may assume that |T | = |S| + 1 (and use induction if
|T | > |S|+1). Hence T differs from S by one item, and let us call this item a. We need to show
that fp|T (Bp) ≥ fp|T (Ap). Given that the allocations produced by PE are non-redundant, this
translates to proving that |Bp| ≥ |Ap|. Assume for the sake of contradiction that |Bp| < |Ap|.
In this case, necessarily a ∈ Bp (because otherwise B could be output by PE instead of A when
player p reported fp|S, and as A and B have different utility vectors, at least one of them is not
Lorenz dominating).
Let S+ be the set of those indices j for which |Aj | > |Bj |, let S− be the set of indices j
for which |Aj | < |Bj |, and let S= be the set of indices j for which |Aj | = |Bj |. Observe that
p ∈ S+ and hence S+ is non-empty. As B allocates at least as many items as A (since it is
welfare maximizing), then S− is non-empty as well. Among all players in S+, let q denote the
unique player that minimizes |Bq|, breaking ties in favour of higher priority players. Likewise,
among all players in S−, let r denote the unique player that minimizes |Ar|, breaking ties in
favour of higher priority players. Now there are two cases to consider, and each of them leads
to a contradiction.
• Either |Ar| < |Bq|, or |Ar| = |Bq| and r has higher priority than q. In this case, Lemma 17
(with i = r) implies that we can transform A into an allocation in which r gains an item,
and a player k in S+ loses an item. Note that even after losing an item, k has at least |Bk|
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items, implying (together with the condition defining the case) that the new allocation
Lorenz dominates A (with respect to the priority order of the PE mechanism). This
contradicts the assumption that A was chosen by the PE mechanism.
• Either |Ar| > |Bq|, or |Ar| = |Bq| and r has lower priority than q. In this case switch
the roles of A and B (and of S+ and S−) and apply Lemma 17 with i = q. The lemma
transforms B into an allocation in which q gains an item, and some player k (in the
original S−) loses an item, and this new allocation Lorenz-dominates B.

Lemma 22 The PE mechanism is strongly faithful.
Proof. Fix the MRF valuation functions of all players, and let Bv be the allocation to player
v who reported fv. By faithfulness (Proposition 20), if v’s report changes to fv|Bv then the
allocation to v remains Bv. Let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be the full allocation at this point. Now
consider a set S ⊂ Bv with |S| = |Bv| − 1. To prove strong faithfulness it suffices to show
that the allocation to v when v reports fv|S is S (and then induction implies the same when
|S| < |Bv| − 1).
Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be the full allocation when v reports fv|S . Assume for the sake of
contradiction that Av 6= S. Then by non-redundancy, |Av| ≤ |Bv| − 2. Let e denote the unique
item in Bv \ S. Consider the sets S+, S− and S= as in Lemma 17, and observe that v ∈ S−.
As the number of items allocated under B is at most one more than under A (and recall that
|Av| ≤ |Bv| − 2), S+ includes at least one player. Now we complete the proof via an argument
copied almost verbatim from the proof of Lemma 21, except for a small change in the first of
the two cases below.
Among all players in S+, let q denote the unique player that minimizes |Bq|, breaking ties
in favour of higher priority players. Likewise, among all players in S−, let r denote the unique
player that minimizes |Ar|, breaking ties in favour of higher priority players. Now there are two
cases to consider, and each of them leads to a contradiction.
• Either |Ar| < |Bq|, or |Ar| = |Bq| and r has higher priority than q. In this case, Lemma 17
(with i = r) implies that we can transform A into an allocation in which r gains an item,
and a player k in S+ loses an item. Importantly (see the remark in the proof of Lemma 17),
we can do so without transferring item e to player v (recall that in the setting of A, player
v does not desire item e), because |Bv| ≥ |Av | + 2. Note that even after losing an item,
k has at least |Bk| items, implying (together with the condition defining the case) that
the new allocation Lorenz dominates A (with respect to the priority order of the PE
mechanism). This contradicts the assumption that A was chosen by the PE mechanism.
• Either |Ar| > |Bq|, or |Ar| = |Bq| and r has lower priority than q. In this case switch
the roles of A and B (and of S+ and S−) and apply Lemma 17 with i = q. The lemma
transforms B into an allocation in which q gains an item, and some player k (in the
original S−) loses an item, and this new allocation Lorenz-dominates B.

Remark 23 The combination of strong faithfulness and monotonicity implies a Lipschitz prop-
erty for PE. That is, if agent i changes its report from fi|S to fi|(S∪{a}) (for an MRF fi, a set S,
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and an item a 6∈ S), then the number of items allocated to i increases by at most 1 (and does not
decrease, by monotonicity). To see this, suppose that for fi|S the allocation to player i is Ai, for
fi|(S∪{a}) the allocation is A
′
v, and |A′v| ≥ |Av |+2. By faithfulness, reporting fi|A′v the allocation
remains A′v. By strong faithfulness, reporting fi|(A′v\{a}) gives the allocation A
′
v \ {a}, and this
allocation contains more items than Av. As (A
′
v \ {a}) ⊂ S, this contradicts monotonicity.
B.4 Polynomial Time Algorithm for the PE Mechanism
We next restate and prove Theorem 9.
Theorem 9 If the players have MRF valuations with succinct representations, then the PE
mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time.
Proof. Given a priority order σ (w.l.o.g., from 1 to n) over the players and MRF valuation
functions f1, . . . , fn, we reduce the problem of finding a Lorenz dominating allocation (with
respect to σ) to a polynomial sequence of matroid intersection problems.
The matroid intersection problem has a set S of mn items, arranged in n groups, S1, . . . Sn,
each with m items. For every item e ∈ M , make n copies e1, . . . , en of the item, placing ei in
Si for every i. We now define two matroids over S. A set T is independent in matroid M1 if
and only if for every i ∈ [n] the set T ∩ Si is independent with respect to the MRF fi. A set is
independent in matroid M2 if for each of the original items e ∈M , the set T contains at most
one of its copies. There is a natural bijection between the set of non-redundant allocations and
the independent sets of M1 ∩M2. In this bijection, an allocation A is mapped to the set T that
is independent in M1 ∩M2, where ej ∈ T iff item e is allocated to player j under A. Hence
allocations that maximize welfare correspond to independent sets of maximum rank. These
can be found by a matroid intersection algorithm [28]. Matroid intersection algorithms can be
run in polynomial time if one is given oracle access to independence queries for each of the two
matroids M1 and M2. Having a succinct representation for the MRFs (that allows answering
value queries) suffices for this purpose.
Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be an allocation that maximizes welfare, found by the matroid inter-
section algorithm. As A need not be Lorenz dominating, we are not done yet. To proceed, we
use the correspondence between Lorenz dominating allocations and min-square allocations (see
Proposition 5). Specifically, given the priority order, it can be seen that the Lorenz dominating
allocation is the one that minimizes the potential
∑
i∈[n](|Ai|+ in)2.
We now present a polynomial time algorithm that tests whether A is an allocation of smallest
potential (among allocations that maximize welfare), and if the outcome is negative, it returns a
maximum welfare allocation C with smaller potential. We shall use Lemma 17. Suppose that A
does not minimize potential, and let B denote an arbitrary Lorenz dominating allocation (and
hence it has smallest potential). Let i ∈ S− be the player with smallest |Ai| (breaking ties in
favour of players of higher priority). Let j ∈ S+ be the player with smallest |Bi| (breaking ties
in favour of players of higher priority). Necessarily |Ai| ≤ |Bj|, with equality only if i has higher
priority than j, as otherwise B cannot be Lorenz dominating. Applying Lemma 17, there is an
allocation C whose vector of utilities differs from that of A in two entries: i gains one item, and
a player k ∈ S+ loses one item. Necessarily, C has smaller potential than A. To find such an
allocation C (note that neither B nor the sets S− and S+ are known to the algorithm), try all
O(n2) choices for (i, k) that make sense (e.g., no need to consider pairs for which |Ai| > |Ak|).
The feasibility of each such choice can be checked as follows. Observe that for every nonnegative
integer t and every MRF fi the function fi|≤t defined as fi|≤t(T ) = min[t, fi(T )] (for every set
T ⊂ M), is still an MRF. Solve the matroid intersection problem with the following modified
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MRF valuation functions f1|≤t1 , . . . , fn|≤tn , where ti = |Ai|+ 1, tk = |Ak| − 1, and tj = |Aj | for
every j ∈ [n] \ {i, k}.
After at most O(m2n2) iterations an allocation of smallest potential is found. This is because
the potential is a multiple of 1
n2
, and the highest possible potential is at most (m+ 1)2. 
C Missing proofs for ǫ-Leveled Valuations
C.1 Basic Observations
We next restate and prove Observation 13:
Observation 13 For non-negative ǫ < 1m , and any ǫ-dichotomous valuation f , the floor func-
tion fˆ is dichotomous and for every set S ⊆M ,
f(S) ≤ (1 + ǫ)fˆ(S). (2)
Additionally, if f is ǫ-leveled then the function fˆ is dichotomous and additive.
Proof. Given a set S = {a1, . . . , ak}
fˆ(S) = ⌊f(S)⌋ = ⌊
k∑
i=1
f(ai | {a1, . . . ai−1})⌋
= ⌊
k∑
i=1
⌊f(ai | {a1, . . . ai−1})⌋+
k∑
i=1
(f(ai | {a1, . . . ai−1})− ⌊f(ai | {a1, . . . ai−1})⌋)⌋
=
k∑
i=1
⌊f(ai | {a1, . . . ai−1})⌋,
where the last equality is since the second sum is strictly less than 1 since we sum k ≤ m terms,
and each is at most ǫ < 1/m. Therefore:
fˆ(a | S) = ⌊f(a | S)⌋ ∈ {0, 1}
and thus fˆ is dichotomous.
If f is also additive, then so is fˆ(a). 
Observation 24 Given a mechanism M for dichotomous valuations, let Mˆ be the allocation
mechanism for ǫ-dichotomous valuations such that for every valuations f the allocation Mˆ(f)
is defined to be the allocation M(fˆ). It holds that:
1. if M is maximin fair, then Mˆ is 11+ǫ -maximin fair.
2. If M is EF1 then Mˆ is 11+ǫ -EF1.
3. If M is EFX then Mˆ is 11+ǫ -EFX.
4. If M is truthful then Mˆ is ǫ-truthful.
Proof. Let A be the allocation Mˆ(f).
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1. We first observe that for ǫ < 1m and every ǫ-dichotomous valuation fv, it holds that:
maximin(fv) ≤ (1 + ǫ)maximin(fˆv). (3)
This follows by considering the values of fv and fˆv in the maximin partition according to
fv and Equation (2).
We have that for each agent v and any possible allocation Av (when reporting fv):
fv(Av)
(1)
≥ fˆv(Av) ≥ maximin(fˆ)
(3)
≥ 1
1 + ǫ
maximin(f).
2. By EF1 of M with respect to fˆ for every players v1, v2, if Av2 is not empty there exists
an item a ∈ Av2 such that:
fv1(Av1)
(1)
≥ fˆv1(Av1) ≥ fˆv1(Av2 \ {a})
(2)
≥ 1
1 + ǫ
fv1(Av2 \ {a}).
3. By EFX of M with respect to fˆ for every players v1, v2 and for every item a ∈ Av2 it
holds that:
fv1(Av1)
(1)
≥ fˆv1(Av1) ≥ fˆv1(Av2 \ {a})
(2)
≥ 1
1 + ǫ
fv1(Av2 \ {a}).
4. By truthfulness ofM with respect to fˆ for every allocations A,A′ where A is the allocation
under truthful reporting, and A′ is the allocation of the non-truthful reporting. It holds
that:
fv1(Av1)
(1)
≥ fˆv1(Av1) ≥ fˆv1(A′v1)
(2)
≥ 1
1 + ǫ
fv1(A
′
v1).

Observation 25 For ǫ-dichotomous valuations f , every reasonable allocation A gives 11+ǫ -
approximation to the social welfare.
Proof. Let Aopt be the welfare maximizing allocation. We have that:
∑
v
fv(Av) ≥
∑
v
fˆv(Av) ≥
∑
v
fˆv(A
opt
v )
(2)
≥ 1
1 + ǫ
∑
v
fv(A
opt
v ),
where the second inequality is by definition of reasonable A maximizes the social welfare of the
corresponding dichotomous valuations. 
C.2 Impossibilities for ǫ-Leveled Players
We next restate and prove Proposition 12.
Proposition 12 There is no deterministic truthful allocation mechanism for allocating three
items to two ǫ-leveled players that always outputs approximately welfare maximizing allocations,
and in case that a player desires two items, he gets at least one of them.
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Proof. Let M = {a, b, c}, and V = {u, v}. We denote an ǫ-leveled valuation function f over
M as the vector rf = (f(a), f(b), f(c)). Given a vector r of size 3, we denote by fr the additive
function such that for every S, fr({a}) = r1, fr({b}) = r2, fr({c}) = r3. For an allocation A
and a player w ∈ V , Aw is the set of items allocated to player w
Let M be a deterministic truthful mechanism that approximates the social welfare for ǫ-
leveled players. We look at the three allocations A1 = M((1 + ǫ, 0, 0), (1 + ǫ, 0, 0)), A2 =
M((0, 1 + ǫ, 0), (0, 1 + ǫ, 0)), A3 = M((0, 0, 1 + ǫ), (0, 0, 1 + ǫ)). By that M is almost welfare
maximizer, it must be that a (resp. b, c) is allocated in A1 (resp. A2, A3). Thus, there exists
a player that in at least two of these three allocations, was allocated the item he desires. We
assume w.l.o.g. that player u is that player and a ∈ A1u and b ∈ A2u.
Let A4 =M((1 + ǫ, 1, 0), (1 + ǫ, 0, 0)). By that M is almost welfare maximizer, we get that
A4u must contain b, and by truthfulness of player u we get that f(1+ǫ,1,0)(A
4
u) ≥ f(1+ǫ,1,0)(A1u) =
1 + ǫ > 1 = f(1+ǫ,1,0)({b}), where the first equality is since a ∈ A1u. Thus, A4u must also contain
item a, so A4u contains both items, a and b.
By symmetry, for A5 =M((1, 1+ǫ, 0), (0, 1+ǫ, 0)), we get that a, b ∈ A5u. Let A6 =M((1+
ǫ, 1, 0), (0, 1 + ǫ, 0)). By truthfulness for player u, we get that f(1+ǫ,1,0)(A
6
u) ≥ f(1+ǫ,1,0)(A5u) =
2 + ǫ > 1 + ǫ = max(f(1+ǫ,1,0)({a}), f(1+ǫ,1,0)({b})), therefore, both a and b must be in A6u.
Let A7 = M((1 + ǫ, 1, 0), (1, 1 + ǫ, 0)). By truthfulness for player v it must be that 0 =
f(1+ǫ,0,0)(A
4
v) ≥ f(1+ǫ,0,0)(A7v), therefore a /∈ A7u. By truthfulness for player v it must be that
0 = f(0,1+ǫ,0)(A
6
v) ≥ f(0,1+ǫ,0)(A7v), therefore b /∈ A7u. Thus, allocation A7 does not satisfy the
fairness property for player v. 
We next restate and prove Proposition 14.
Proposition 14 Consider any of the following fairness properties: being Lorentz dominating,
being min-square, maximizing NSW, being lex-min, being EFX. Every randomized truthful in
expectation allocation mechanism for allocating two items to two ǫ-leveled players either some-
times fails to satisfy this property ex-post, even with respect to fˆ , or sometimes fails to be
reasonable (fails to allocate a demanded item to some player who demands it).
Proof. Let the set of items be M = {L,H}, and consider two players with the same ǫ-leveled
valuation function f , satisfying f(L) = 1 and f(H) = 1 + ǫ. When both players report their
true valuation, any Lorentz dominating allocation (and likewise for lex-min, NSW, min square,
and likewise for a reasonable allocation that is EFX) gives each player one item. Thus, in that
case at least one player has positive probability of getting item L. W.l.o.g., let player 1 be that
player. If player 1 reports a valuation f1(L) = 0, f1(H) = 1 + ǫ and player 2 reports truthfully,
the only Lorentz dominating allocation (and likewise for the other fairness properties considered
here) is that player 1 receives item H (and player 2 receives L). Therefore player 1 gains higher
utility by not reporting her true valuation function. 
C.3 Proof of the Main Theorem for ǫ-leveled Valuations
In this section we restate and prove Theorem 16. We first prove a useful claim about MX :
Proposition 15 For players that have additive dichotomous valuations, MX is reasonable,
truthful, EF1, and moreover, a player never envies a player that has lower priority than him.
Proof. MX is reasonable since every item in X will be allocated if and only if it is in Rv for
some player v, and only to a player that demands it.
MX is truthful for additive dichotomous players since if a player receives the whole set X
by being truthful, he cannot gain by misreporting. Else, by manipulating, the player can either
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add an unwanted item, or trade a wanted item by another which does not increase his value
since his valuation is dichotomous.
MX is EF1 since the only case where a player receives two items, is if he is the only one
that demanded item X[2]. For two players u and v such that u has higher priority than v, u
does not envy v at all since the only way for v to get an item that u desires, is if u got another
item. 
We next restate and prove Theorem 16, showing that mechanism ML satisfies multiple
desired properties.
Theorem 16 When all players are ǫ-leveled for ǫ < 1nm3 mechanism ML has the following
properties:
1. ML is a truthful in expectation mechanism. I.e., each player maximizes his expected value
(over the randomization of the mechanism) by reporting the set of items he demands truth-
fully, for any reports of the others.15 Additionally, the mechanism is ex-post ǫ-truthful.
2. ML is reasonable. Thus the welfare ex-post is at least 11+ǫ -fraction of the maximum
welfare, when players are truthful.
3. ML guarantees every truthful agent his 11+ǫ -maximin share. Additionally, ML is 11+ǫ -EF1
for truthful agents.
4. Each truthful player receives his proportional share in expectation.16
5. ML can be implemented in polynomial time in the number of items and agents.
Proof. In this proof, whenever we write expectation or probability, the probability space is over
the randomness of ML (i.e., the list X, and the priorities σ). We prove Item 1 (truthfulness)
in Lemma 26, Item 2 (reasonable) in Lemma 28, Item 3 (ex-post fairness) in Lemma 29, Item
4 (proportional in expectation) in Lemma 32, and Item 5 (polynomial time) in Lemma 34. 
Lemma 26 ML is a truthful in expectation mechanism. I.e., each player maximizes his ex-
pected value (over the randomization of the mechanism) by reporting the set of items he demands
truthfully, for any reports of the others.Additionally, the mechanism is ex-post ǫ-truthful.
Proof. We prove that player v with demanded set Dv, and a corresponding valuation fv, cannot
benefit from deviating and reporting Rv that is not Dv. Let Ri be the report of player i for
i 6= v. Given the reports of all players but v, let A (resp. A˜) be the allocation when player v is
being truthful (resp. reporting Rv). We denote by A
B (resp. A˜B) the corresponding allocation
returned by MB , and we denote by AX (resp. A˜X) the corresponding allocation returned by
MX .
Since MB ,MX are truthful with respect to additive dichotomous players, we get that
fˆv(A
B
v ) ≥ fˆv(A˜Bv ), and fˆv(AXv ) ≥ fˆv(A˜Xv ). Therefore we get that:
fˆv(Av) = fˆv(A
B
v ) + fˆv(A
X
v ) ≥ fˆv(A˜Bv ) + fˆv(A˜Xv ) = fˆv(A˜v). (4)
If Dv ∩ Ri = ∅ for every i 6= v, reporting truthfully is dominant since in this case player v
will get Dv which maximizes his value.
15Moreover, if it is known to the player that at least one of his demanded items is also demanded by some
other player, then being truthful is the unique strategy that maximizes his expected utility.
16For additive valuations, the proportional share is at least the maximin share.
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Else; there exist an agent i and an item j such that j ∈ Ri ∩ Dv. By Observation 24 we
know that MB is ǫ-truthful, implying that a player loss from being truthful is small. We show
that by reporting truthfully, the allocation AXv is significantly preferred over A˜
X
v in expectation
(enough to overcome the loss inMB .) Combining these two observations yields the truthfulness
of ML. To prove the claim about MX we first show that:
Lemma 27 For every player v, if there is an item j and a player i such that j ∈ Ri∩Dv, then:
E[fv(A
X
v )] ≥
1
nm2
+
E[fv(A˜
X
v )]
1 + ǫ
. (5)
Proof. We prove this inequality by considering two cases of Rv.
Case 1 [Hiding desired items]: There exists ℓ ∈ Dv \Rv (i.e., v misreported and did not
report item ℓ that he actually demands). Let e1 be the event that X = (ℓ), and v is the highest
priority player according to σ (in MX), and let e¯1 be the complement event. Then:
E[fv(A
X
v )]
(1)
≥ E[fˆv(AXv )]
= E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | e1] · Pr[e1] + E[fˆv(AXv ) | e¯1] · Pr[e¯1]
≥ E[fˆv(A˜Xv ) + 1 | e1] · Pr[e1] + E[fˆv(A˜Xv ) | e¯1] · Pr[e¯1]
= Pr[e1] + E[fˆv(A˜
X
v )]
(2)
≥ 1
nm2
+
E[fv(A˜
X
v )]
1 + ǫ
,
where the second inequality holds since in event e1, fˆv(A
X
v ) = 1 and fˆv(A˜
X
v ) = 0, and thatMX
is truthful. Additionally, the third inequality uses the fact that Pr[e1] =
1
nm2
(v has highest
priority with probability 1/n, independently, |X| = 1 with probability 1/m, conditional on
|X| = 1, l is the item in X with probability 1/m).
Case 2 [Reporting undesired items as desired]: There exists ℓ ∈ Rv \Dv (i.e., v added
undemanded item ℓ to his report). Let e2 be the event that X = (ℓ, j) (recall that j ∈ Ri∩Dv),
and v has the highest priority in mechanism MX . Then:
E[fv(A
X
v )]
(1)
≥ E[fˆv(AXv )]
= E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | e2] · Pr[e2] + E[fˆv(AXv ) | e¯2] · Pr[e¯2]
≥ E[fˆv(A˜Xv ) + 1 | e2] · Pr[e2] + E[fˆv(A˜Xv ) | e¯2] · Pr[e¯2]
= Pr[e2] + E[fˆv(A˜
X
v )]
(2)
≥ 1
nm2
+
E[fv(A˜
X
v )]
1 + ǫ
,
where the second inequality holds since in event e2, fˆv(A
X
v ) = 1 and fˆv(A˜
X
v ) = 0, and that
MX is truthful. Additionally, the third inequality uses the fact that Pr[e2] = 1nm2 (v has
highest priority with probability 1/n, independently, |X| = 2 with probability (m− 1)/m, and
X = (l, j), conditional on |X| = 2, with probability 1/(m(m− 1))).  With Lemma 27 we
now prove that ML is truthful in expectation. It holds that:
E[fv(Av)] = E[fv(A
B
v )] + E[fv(A
X
v )]
(5)
≥ E[fv(A˜
B
v )]
1 + ǫ
+
E[fv(A˜
X
v )]
1 + ǫ
+
1
nm2
>
E[fv(A˜v)]
1 + ǫ
+
ǫ ·E[fv(A˜v)]
1 + ǫ
= E[fv(A˜v)],
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where the first inequality is since that MB is ǫ-truthful by Observation 24, and the second
inequality is since E[fv(A˜v)] ≤ (1 + ǫ)m and ǫ < 1nm3 .
We now prove that ML is ex-post ǫ-truthful. Since both MB and MX are (ex-post)
truthful for additive dichotomous players, it follows immediately that ML is (ex-post) truthful
for additive dichotomous players. Combining with Observation 24 we get that ML is ex-post
ǫ-truthful. 
Lemma 28 ML is reasonable. Thus the welfare ex-post is at least 11+ǫ -fraction of the maximum
welfare, when players are truthful.
Proof. ML is reasonable since bothMB ,MX are reasonable and since the players are additive.
If A1 (resp. A2) is a reasonable allocation for the set of items M1 (resp. M2), then A
1 ∪A2 is
reasonable for the set of items M1 ⊔M2.
The guarantee of the social welfare follows by Observation 25. 
Lemma 29 ML guarantees every truthful agent his 11+ǫ-maximin share. Additionally, ML is
1
1+ǫ -EF1 for truthful agents.
Proof. Assume that player v is truthful, that is Rv = Dv. By Observation 24 it is enough to
show that ML is maximin fair and EF1 for additive dichotomous valuations.
Let i be the priority of player v in MB . Under the reports of R, we denote by A (resp.
AB , AX) the allocation ML (resp. MB ,MX). Note that if i = n and |Rv ∩X| ≥ 1 or i = n− 1
and |Rv ∩X| ≥ 2 then AXv 6= ∅, therefore:
fˆv(A
X
v ) ≥
⌊
i+ |X ∩Rv| − 1
n
⌋
(6)
We next present some properties of MB that we use in the proof that ML is EF1 and
maximin fair.
Observation 30 In MB, a player with MRF valuation does not envy players with lower pri-
ority.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that a player v envies a lower priority player u. Since
MB is not redundant, it means that |ABv | = fˆv(ABv ) < fˆv(ABu ) = |ABu ∩ Rv|. By the exchange
property of matroids, there exists an item in ABu ∩ Rv, such that transferring this item from u
to v, will be a non-redundant allocation in which v gets higher value, and therefore will Lorenz-
dominates AB which contradicts that MB returns a Lorenz-dominating allocation with respect
to the priority order. 
We now give a tighter bound of the number of items allocated byMB to a player depending
on his priority.
Claim 31 For players that report additive dichotomous valuations, for every i ∈ [n], mechanism
MB allocates at least
⌈
|Rv\X|−i+1
n
⌉
items to the player v that has priority i.
Proof. Fixing the set X, let nv be the number of items allocated by MB to player v. Since
MB is EF1, for every player u with higher priority than v (there are i − 1 such players), the
number of items allocated to u among Rv \X is at most nv + 1. By Observation 30, in MB
player v does not envy player with lower priority than v (there are n − i such players), the
36
number of items allocated to u among Rv \X is at most nv. Since MB is welfare maximizer, it
must be that all items in Rv are allocated, thus (i− 1) · (nv + 1) + nv + (n− i) · nv ≥ |Rv \X|,
which implies the claim. 
With Observation 30 and Claim 31 we can prove that ML is maximin fair and EF1 for
additive dichotomous players.
We first prove that ML is maximin fair for additive dichotomous valuations. Consider a
player v. It holds that
maximin(fˆv) =
⌊ |Rv|
n
⌋
. (7)
It holds that:
fˆv(Av) = fˆv(A
B
v ) + fˆv(A
X
v )
(6)
≥
⌈ |Rv \X| − i+ 1
n
⌉
+
⌊
i+ |X ∩Rv| − 1
n
⌋
≥
⌊ |Rv|
n
⌋
(7)
= maximin(fˆ), (8)
where the first inequality is by Inequality (6) and Claim 31, and the last inequality is by the
fact that ⌈ an⌉+ ⌊ bn⌋ ≥ ⌊a+bn ⌋ for every integers a, b.
Now we prove that ML is EF1 for additive dichotomous players. We have that MB is EF1
for additive dichotomous players, furthermore, by Observation 30 in the allocation AB , players
with higher priority do not envy players with lower priority (priorities in MB). Let, u, v be
any two players. If u has higher priority than player v (in MB), then fˆu(ABu ) ≥ fˆu(ABv ), and
if u has lower priority than player v (in MB) then fˆu(ABu ) ≥ fˆu(ABv ) − 1. By Claim 15, we
have thatMX is EF1, and players with higher priority (inMX) do not envy players with lower
priority. I.e., if u has higher priority than player v (in MX), then fˆu(AXu ) ≥ fˆu(AXv ), and if u
has lower priority than v (in MX) then fˆu(AXu ) ≥ fˆu(AXv )− 1. We are now ready to prove that
player u does not envy player v up to one item (i.e., fˆu(Au) ≥ fˆu(Av)− 1).
Since the priorities in MB and MX are reversed, we get that
Case 1: If u has higher priority than v in MB (and lower priority in MX) then
fˆu(Au) = fˆu(A
B
u ) + fˆu(A
X
u ) ≥ fˆu(ABv ) + fˆu(AXv )− 1 = fˆu(Av)− 1.
Case 2: If u has lower priority than v in MB (and higher priority in MX) then
fˆu(Au) = fˆu(A
B
u ) + fˆu(A
X
u ) ≥ fˆu(ABv )− 1 + fˆu(AXv ) = fˆu(Av)− 1.
This completes the proof.

Lemma 32 Each truthful player receives his proportional share in expectation.17
Proof. Suppose that player v is truthful, that is Rv = Dv . We show that v receives his
proportional share in expectation. For agent v and profile of reports R = (R1, . . . , Rn), if for
all i it holds that Ri = Rv then the allocation will always be the same partition, allocated
according to the permutation over priorities. Thus, agent v will get each set of the partition
with probability 1n which yields an expected value of
fv(Rv)
n .
17For additive valuations, the proportional share is at least the maximin share.
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Else, there exists i 6= v such that Ri 6= Rv. It holds that:
fv(Rv)
n
(2)
≤ (1 + ǫ)fˆv(Rv)
n
= (1 + ǫ)
|Rv |
n
. (9)
Under the reports of R, we denote by A (resp. AB , AX) the allocation of ML (resp.
MB ,MX).
For every given list S of size in {1, 2}, by Claim 31, given that X = S, if player v has priority
i then |ABv | ≥
⌈
|Rv\S|−i+1
n
⌉
. Thus, when considering the expectation over the priorities of v for
a fixed S:
Eσ[fˆv(A
B
v ) | X = S] ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
⌈ |Rv \ S| − i+ 1
n
⌉
=
|Rv \ S|
n
=
|Rv|
n
− |Rv ∩ S|
n
, (10)
where the first equality is since for every x = an + b (for 0 ≤ b < n), the number of terms in
{⌈x−in ⌉}0≤i<n that equals a+ 1 (resp. a) is b (resp. n− b).
When taking expectation also over X, we get that:
E[fˆv(A
B
v )]
(10)
≥ |Rv|
n
− E[|Rv ∩X|]
n
=
|Rv|
n
− |Rv | · E[|X|]
nm
=
|Rv |
n
· m
2 − 2m+ 1
m2
. (11)
where for the last equality we used E[|X|] = 1m + 2(1− 1m) = 2− 1m .
Equation (11) basically states that the expected number of items that MB allocates to v is
at least |Rv| times the expected fraction of items that are not in X, divided by n.
Lemma 33 For every player v, if there exists a player i such that Rv 6= Ri then
E[fˆv(A
X
v )] ≥
1
m2n(n− 1) +
|Rv |(2m− 1)
nm2
. (12)
Proof. Let α
def
= |X|.
By considering the two possible values of α we observe that:
E[fˆv(A
X
v )] =
1
m
E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | α = 1] +
m− 1
m
E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | α = 2]. (13)
Similarly to Equation (11) for a fixed α′ ∈ {1, 2} we have that
E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | α = α′] ≥
E[|Rv ∩X| | α = α′]
n
=
α′ · |Rv|
nm
, (14)
where Equation (14) is by conditioning on the size of Rv ∩X. If |Rv ∩X| = 1 and if v is the
highest priority player in MX then he gets it. If |Rv ∩ X| = 2 and v among the two highest
original priority players in MX then he gets at least one item.
We consider two cases of R = (R1, . . . , Rn):
Case 1: There exist a player i and item j such that j ∈ Rv \ Ri. In this case if X = (j)
then the probability over the priorities that player v will get item j is at least 1n−1 , thus:
E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | α = 1] = E[fˆv(AXv ) | X = (j) ∧ α = 1] · Pr[X = (j) | α = 1] +
E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | X 6= (j) ∧ α = 1] · Pr[X 6= (j) | α = 1]
≥ 1
m
· 1
n− 1 +
m− 1
m
· |Rv| − 1
n(m− 1) =
1
mn(n− 1) +
|Rv |
nm
, (15)
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since for every a ∈ Rv \ {j} if X = (a) then a is allocated to v with probability of at least 1n
while if X = (j), j is allocated to v with probability at least 1n−1 .
By combining Equations (13),(14),(15), we get that:
E[fˆv(A
X
v )] ≥
1
m
(
1
mn(n− 1) +
|Rv|
nm
)
+
m− 1
m
· 2 · |Rv|
nm
=
1
m2n(n− 1) +
|Rv|(2m− 1)
nm2
.
Case 2: There exist a player i and an item j such that j ∈ Ri \Rv . In this case if X = (j, ℓ)
for ℓ ∈ Rv, then the probability over the priorities that player v will get ℓ is at least 1n−1 , thus:
E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | α = 2] = E[fˆv(AXv ) | X = (j, ℓ) ∧ α = 2] · Pr[X = (j, ℓ) | α = 2] +
E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | 2 = |X ∩Rv| ∧ α = 2] · Pr[|X ∩Rv| = 2 | α = 2] +
E[fˆv(A
X
v ) | X 6= (j, ℓ) ∧ |X ∩Rv| = 1 ∧ α = 2]×
Pr[X 6= (j, ℓ) ∧ |X ∩Rv| = 1 | α = 2]
≥ 1
n− 1 ·
1
m(m− 1) +
2
n
· |Rv |(Rv| − 1)
m(m− 1) +
1
n
· 2 · |Rv |(m− |Rv|)− 1
m(m− 1)
=
1
m(m− 1)n(n − 1) +
2|Rv|
mn
, (16)
where the inequality holds since if X = (j, ℓ) then the expected number of items player v gets
is at least 1n−1 . If X 6= (j, ℓ) then the expected number of items player v gets is at least |Rv∩X|n .
By combining Equations (13),(14),(16), we get that:
E[fˆv(A
X
v )] ≥
1
m
· |Rv|
nm
+
m− 1
m
(
1
m(m− 1)n(n− 1) +
2 · |Rv|
nm
)
=
1
m2n(n− 1) +
|Rv|(2m− 1)
nm2
.

With Lemma 33, we have
E[fv(Av)]
(1)
≥ E[fˆv(Av)]
= E[fˆv(A
B
v )] + E[fˆv(A
X
v )]
(11)(12)
≥ |Rv |
n
· m
2 − 2m+ 1
m2
+
1
m2n(n− 1) +
|Rv|(2m − 1)
nm2
>
|Rv |
n
+
ǫ ·m
n
≥ (1 + ǫ)|Rv |
n
(9)
≥ f(Rv)
n
,
which is the proportional share of player v.

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Lemma 34 ML can be implemented in polynomial time in the number of items and agents.
Proof. Agents are asked to report to ML only their demand sets. Consequently, the com-
putational complexity of ML does not depend of the number of bits needed to represent the
valuations, and only depends on the number of agents and items. Both MB and MX can
be implemented in time polynomial in the number of items and agents. Other steps of ML
include selecting a random permutation over the players, and selecting at random one or two
items to be included in X, and these steps can also be implemented efficiently (given a source
of randomness). It follows that ML can be implemented in polynomial time. 
D XOS valuations
We next consider dichotomous valuations beyond the submodular case. A class of valuations
that contains submodular valuations is the class of XOS valuations. An XOS valuation f is
defined by a set of additive valuations {f1, . . . , fk} and for every S, f(S) = maxi∈[k] fi(S). An
XOS dichotomous valuation, is a function that is both XOS and dichotomous. In this appendix
we present some negative results regarding what can be achieved in XOS markets. We use the
following construction of an XOS dichotomous valuation. Given a family F of sets of items, we
define fF (S) = maxT∈F |T ∩ S|. Clearly fF is XOS and dichotomous, since we can define for
every T ∈ F , the additive function fT (S) = |T ∩ S|, and fF is the max over the {fT }T∈F .
We use such valuations to show that it is not possible to extend our result for submodular
dichotomous players to XOS dichotomous players, even if there are only two players and only
four items. We show that truthfulness and welfare maximization are at odds, even if one
disregards all fairness considerations. This holds not only for deterministic truthful mechanisms,
but even for randomized mechanisms that are only required to be truthful in expectation, as
long as the mechanism must still maximize welfare ex-post.
Proposition 35 For the setting with two dichotomous XOS players and four items, there is no
randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism that always maximizes welfare.
Proof. Let the set of items M = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Given a family F of feasible subsets of M , let fF
be the XOS dichotomous function
fF (S) = max
T∈F
|T ∩ S|
Consider any mechanism that always picks an allocation that maximizes the welfare. If both
players have the same family F1 with only one feasible set T = {2, 3, 4}, then there is a player
that gets more than one item in expectation, as welfare maximization implies that all three
items in {2, 3, 4} must be allocated. W.l.o.g., we assume that player 1 is that player. Suppose
now that player 1 has the family F2, that contains T and the set {1}, then if player 1 reports
F2 (and player 2 reports F1), a welfare maximizing mechanism must allocate item 1 to player 1
and the remaining items to player 2. Yet player 1 can get higher expected value by reporting
F1, and thus the mechanism is not truthful in expectation. 
Remark 36 The same arguments of the proof of Proposition 35 shows that similarly there is no
randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism that always maximizes the Nash social welfare.
We next show that every truthful mechanism cannot give a
√
3 − 1 approximation to the
optimal social welfare.
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Theorem 37 For any c >
√
3− 1, there is no truthful deterministic allocation mechanism for
two dichotomous XOS agents that always gives a c-fraction of the maximal welfare.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there is such a mechanism. Consider a market
with two agents and two (large enough) disjoint sets of items A,B as we define below. We
define FA = {A}, FAB = {A,B}. If both agents report their valuation is fFA, by welfare
approximation at least c · |A| are allocated, and w.l.o.g., assume that agent 1 receives at least
c
2 · |A|. If |B| = c2 · |A| − 1, then if agent 1 reports his valuation is fFAB , instead of fFA, he
cannot receive items from B (since it will decrease his welfare). Thus, the welfare is bounded
by |A| although the maximal social welfare is |A|+ |B|. Since c · (|A| + c2 · |A| − 1) > |A|, (for
large enough |A|) this leads to a contradiction. 
We next show that for dichotomous XOS valuations there are instances with n items in which
the maximum welfare is almost factor 2− 1/n larger than the welfare of any EF1 allocation.
Theorem 38 There exists a setting with n players with dichotomous XOS valuations in which
the maximal social welfare is 2nk + n − k, while any EF1 allocation has social welfare at most
n(k + 1). Thus, for any fixed n, for any ǫ > 0, the ratio of the maximal welfare to the welfare
of any EF1 allocation is at least 2− 1/n − ǫ when k is large enough.
Proof. Fix a large k. Let S1, . . . , Sk be disjoints sets of items such that |S1| = n(k + 1), and
|Sj | = k for 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Let F1 = {S1}, and let Fj = {S1, Sj} for j > 1, and the valaution
of agent j is fFj . The maximal social welfare is obtained by giving each agent j the set Sj,
yielding a welfare of n(k + 1) + (n − 1)k = 2nk + n− k. When considering an EF1 allocation,
either it only allocates items from S1. In this case the welfare is bounded by n(k + 1). Else
there exists a player j 6= 1 that gets items from Sj . In this case, by the EF1 property no agent
can get more than k + 1 items from S1, therefore their value cannot exceed k + 1. Thus, the
welfare cannot exceed n(k + 1)− 1.
The ratio of the maximal welfare to the maximal welfare of an EF1 allocation is (2nk+n−
k)/((k + 1)n) = (2k + 1)/(k + 1)− k/((k + 1)n) and it tends to 2− 1/n as k grows large. 
We now consider the notion of Nash Social Welfare (NSW) and show that for dichotomous
XOS valuations, the maximum NSW can be about twice as large as the NSW of any EF1
allocation.
Theorem 39 There exists a setting with n players with dichotomous XOS valuations in which
any EF1 allocation has Nash Social Welfare of at most k/2 + 1, while the maximal NSW is
k · (1/4)1/n. Thus, for any ǫ > 0, the ratio of the maximal NSW to the NSW of any EF1
allocation is at least 2− ǫ when n is large enough.
Proof. Let k >> n be a large even number. Consider the following setting with n players and
k(n−1) items. Let Sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1 be disjoint sets of size k, and let F = {Sj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1}.
Each agent valuation is fF . The maximal NSW is obtained by giving every player j ≤ n−2 the
set Sj , and split Sn−1 equally between player n− 1 and player n. This allocation has a NSW of
(kn−2 · (k/2)2)1/n = k · (1/4)1/n. On the other hand, in any allocation at least one player gets
at most k/2 items, so in any EF1 allocation, every player gets at most k/2 + 1 items, so the
NSW an EF1 allocation is bounded by ((k/2 + 1)n)1/n = k/2 + 1. 
We next show that for the setting of dichotomous XOS, truthful allocation mechanisms
cannot maximize the NSW (and constant fraction of the welfare will sometimes be lost).
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Theorem 40 For any c > 2−1/3, there is no truthful deterministic allocation mechanism for
two XOS dichotomous agents that always gives a c-fraction of the maximal Nash social welfare.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there is such a mechanism. Consider a market
with two agents and two (large enough) disjoint sets of items A,B as we define below. Let
FA = {A}, and let FAB = {A,B}. If both agents report their valuation is fFA , by assumption
the allocation NSW must be such that at least c · |A| items are allocated, and w.l.o.g., assume
that agent 1 receives at least c2 · |A|. If |B| = c2 · |A| − 1, then if agent 1 reports his valuation is
fFAB , instead of fFA , he cannot receive items from B (since it will decrease his welfare). Thus,
the Nash social welfare is bounded by |A|/2 although the maximal social welfare is √|A||B|.
Since c
√|A||B| ≈ c ·√ c2 · |A| > |A|/2, (for large enough |A|) this leads to a contradiction. 
E Best-of-Both-Worlds via Random Priorities
For completeness, we first present a proof of a simple observation for agents with subadditive
valuations: a randomized ex-ante envy-free allocation that is supported on (deterministic) al-
locations that are non-wasteful (for each agent, the marginal value of the set on unallocated
items is zero) is also ex-ante proportional (each agent gets at least 1n of his value for the grand
bundle).
Observation 41 For the class of for subadditive valuation functions, any ex-ante envy-free
randomized allocation that is not wasteful is also ex-ante proportional.
Proof. Assume that A is the (random) allocation and let A0 be the (random) set of unallocated
items. Let fi be the valuation function of agent i. For any realization of A, as the realized
allocation is not wasteful it holds that fi(Ai ∪A0) = fi(Ai), and by subadditivity, fi(Ai∪A0)+∑
j 6=i fi(Aj) ≥ fi(M). By ex-ante envy-freeness, E[fi(Ai)] ≥ E[fi(Aj)] for every i, j, and thus
E[fi(Ai)] ≥ 1n
(
E[fi(Ai)] +
∑
j 6=iE[fi(Aj)]
)
. Combining these three equations imply the claim:
E[fi(Ai)] ≥ 1
n

E[fi(Ai)] +∑
j 6=i
E[fi(Aj)]

 = 1
n

E[fi(Ai ∪A0)] +∑
j 6=i
E[fi(Aj)]

 ≥ 1
n
fi(M).

We next show that our RPE mechanism is stochastically envy free, which together with our
results for the PE mechanism, immediately imply Theorem 10.
Lemma 42 For the class of submodular dichotomous valuations functions, the random priority
egalitarian (RPE) mechanism is stochastically envy-free. This implies that it is also ex-ante envy
free and ex-ante proportional for this class.
Proof. For the purpose of following the proof of this theorem, the reader is advised to recall
Theorem 7 and the notion of auxiliary items that precedes it.
Consider two agents i and j, and two priority orders π and π′, where i appears before j in
π, and π′ is identical to π, except that i and j switch locations. When allocating both items
as well as the auxiliary items, let Aˆ (Aˆ′, respectively) be a Lorenz dominating allocation under
priority order π (π′, respectively), and let A (A′, respectively) be the corresponding allocations
when the auxiliary items are removed. Recall that given π, all Lorenz dominating allocations
have the same sorted vector of utilities. Moreover, Lorenz domination implies that (ignoring
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auxiliary items) A and A′ also have the same vector of utilities, up to permuting the names of
the agents. As i appears before j in π, it implies that in allocation A, agent i cannot envy j,
but j might envy i. Suppose that j does envy i under A, that is, vj(A(i)) > vj(A(j)). Then we
show below that |A′(j)| ≥ |A(i)| and that |A(j)| ≥ |A′(i)|. Lemma 42 follows easily from the
claim, and the fact that vj(A(j)) = |A(j)| and vj(A′(j)) = |A′(j)|, since the RPE mechanism
never allocates undesired items, while vj(A(i)) ≤ |A(i)| and vj(A′(i)) ≤ |A′(i)| as valuations
are dichotomous.
We now prove the claim. As the RPE mechanism never allocates undesired items, vj(A(j)) =
|A(j)|. The fact that j envies i in A together with the EFX property implies that |A(i)| =
|A(j)|+1, and that vj(A(i)) = |A(i)|. The matroid exchange property implies that we can move
one item from A(i) to A(j), and by this get an allocation B in which vj(B(j)) = vj(A(j))+1 =
|A(i)| and vi(B(i)) = |B(i)| = |A(i)| − 1 = |A(j)|. As B has the same utility vector as A (up
to permuting the names of agents), B is a Lorenz dominating allocation. As before, we use Bˆ
to denote the allocation that is identical to B but with each player also getting his auxiliary
item. If Bˆ is a Lorenz dominating allocation with respect to priority order π′, then the claim is
proved. Hence we assume that Aˆ′ strictly Lorenz dominates Bˆ with respect to π′. (Example 43
shows that indeed it may happen that Aˆ′ strictly Lorenz dominates Bˆ with respect to π′.)
Consider π′ (which defines auxiliary items as in Theorem 7), and for each of the allocations
Aˆ′ and Bˆ order the utilities of agents from smallest to largest. Call the first of these sorted
vectors LAˆ′ and the other LBˆ . When auxiliary items are removed, we refer to these vectors as
⌊LA′⌋ and ⌊LB⌋. Note that these vectors are still sorted. Similarly, we define the vectors LAˆ
and ⌊LA⌋ for the allocation Aˆ with auxiliary items as in π. Observe that LAˆ = LBˆ, which holds
because (π, Aˆ) and (π′, Bˆ) only interchange the roles of i and j (both the auxiliary items are
interchanged, and the number of allocated items to each agent are interchanged).
As A′ and B are both Lorenz dominating allocations, then ⌊LA′⌋ and ⌊LB⌋ are identical.
However, with the auxiliary items, LAˆ′ strictly Lorenz dominates LBˆ . Let P (S, respectively)
be the set of agents in the longest prefix (suffix, respectively) in which LAˆ′ and LBˆ are identical.
(The utility identifies the agent, because of the auxiliary items.)
Proof that |A(j)| ≥ |A′(i)|. If i ∈ P then |A′(i)| = |B(i)| = |A(j)|, as desired. If i 6∈ P
then also j 6∈ P (because |B(j)| > |B(i)|). Let p be the agent following P in the sorted vector
for B, and let p′ be the agent following P in the sorted vector for A′. We refer to P ∪ {p′} as
the extended prefix of A′ (and likewise, P ∪ {p} is the extended prefix for B).
1. If p′ = i and p 6= i then |A′(i)| ≤ |B(i)| (otherwise ⌊LA′⌋ and ⌊LB⌋ cannot be identical),
implying |A(j)| ≥ |A′(i)|, as desired.
2. The case p′ = p = i cannot hold because strict Lorenz domination would imply that
|A′(i)| > |B(i)|. This contradicts the fact that ⌊LA′⌋ and ⌊LB⌋ are identical.
3. If p′ 6= i then consider the allocation Aˆ′, but with auxiliary item values set from π instead
of π′. The fact that Aˆ Lorenz dominates Aˆ′ with respect to π (together with LAˆ = LBˆ)
implies that LAˆ′ for π has a different extended prefix compared to LAˆ′ for π
′. This can only
happen if i is moved into the extended prefix (this will happen if i and p′ receive the same
number of items under A′, and i precedes p′ in π but not in π′), but then |A(j)| ≥ |A′(i)|,
as desired.
The combination of the above cases establishes that |A(j)| ≥ |A′(i)|.
Proof that |A′(j)| ≥ |A(i)|. (This proof is analogous to that for |A(j)| ≥ |A′(i)|, but we
present it in full for completeness.) If j ∈ S then |A′(j)| = |B(j)| = |A(i)|, as desired. If j 6∈ S
then also i 6∈ S (because |B(j)| > |B(i)|). Let s be the agent preceding S in the sorted vector
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for B, and let s′ be the agent preceding S in the sorted vector for A′. We refer to S ∪ {s′} as
the extended suffix of A′ (and likewise, S ∪ {s} is the extended prefix for B).
1. If s′ = j and s 6= j then |A′(j)| ≥ |B(j)| (otherwise ⌊LA′⌋ and ⌊LB⌋ cannot be identical),
implying |A′(j)| ≥ |A(i)|, as desired.
2. The case s′ = s = j cannot hold because strict Lorenz domination would imply that
|A′(j)| < |B(j)|. This contradicts the fact that ⌊LA′⌋ and ⌊LB⌋ are identical.
3. If s′ 6= j and s 6= j, then consider the allocation Aˆ′, but with auxiliary item values set
from π instead of π′. The fact that Aˆ Lorenz dominates Aˆ′ with respect to π (together
with LAˆ = LBˆ) implies that LAˆ′ for π has a different extended suffix compared to LAˆ′ for
π′. This can only happen if j is moved into the extended suffix (this will happen if j and
s′ receive the same number of items under A′, and j precedes p′ in π′ but not in π), but
then |A′(j)| ≥ |A(i)|, as desired.
The combination of the above cases establishes that |A′(j)| ≥ |A(i)|. 
In the next example, we show that allocation B in the proof of Lemma 42 might not be
Lorenz dominating with respect to π′.
Example 43 Suppose that there are four agents {1, 2, 3, 4} and six items {a, b, c, d, e1 , e2}. The
sets of items desired by the agents are (a, e1, e2), (a, b), (c, e1, e2), (a, d, e1, e2), respectively.
Valuation functions are additive, except for one exception, which is that for agent 1 items e1
and e2 are substitutes of each other. In every Lorenz dominating allocation two agents get a
pair of items each, and two agents get one item each.
For priority order π = (1, 2, 3, 4), a Lorenz dominating allocation A is {(a, e1), (b), (c, e2), (d)}.
In this allocation agent 4 envies agent 1. For the permuted priority order π′ = (4, 2, 3, 1), al-
location B would leave the bundles allocated to agents 2 and 3 as they were in A. However,
the allocation A′ that is Lorenz dominating for π′ is {(d, e2), (a, b), (c), (e1)}. In this allocation
agent 2 gains an item and agent 3 loses an item. Hence B is not a Lorenz dominating allocation
with respect to π′.
In the following example we show the difference between ex-ante envy-freeness and stochastic
envy-freeness.
Example 44 Consider setting with five items (a, b, c, d, e) and three additive dichotomous agents,
where agent 1 desires (a, b, c), whereas the other two agents desire (a, b, c, d, e). The fractional
allocation in which agent 1 gets item a and agents 2 and 3 get half of each of the remaining items
is ex-ante EF. If this fractional allocation is rounded in such a way that agent 2 gets items (b, c)
with probability 12 and items (d, e) and with probability
1
2 (agent 3 gets the remaining items),
then ex-post, this allocation is EFX. However, the randomized allocation is not stochastically
EF: agent 1 never gets value more than 1, but other agents do get bundles that are worth to
agent 1 more than 1 with positive probability.
F Allocating All Items
In Theorem 1 we present a truthful deterministic allocation mechanism that is welfare maximiz-
ing and EFX, but leaves all undesired items unallocated (non-redundant). One might wonder
if it is possible to always allocate all items and obtain a similar result. We next show that
the result of Theorem 1 is impossible to obtain when one insists on allocating all items (even
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undesired ones). Specifically, we show that there is no truthful deterministic allocation mecha-
nism that always allocates all items, maximizes welfare and is EFX. Moreover, this impossibility
holds even for additive dichotomous agents, and even for two agents.
Theorem 45 For 2 additive dichotomous agents, there is no truthful deterministic allocation
mechanism that is welfare maximizing, EFX, and always allocates all items.
Proof. Consider a market with m ≥ 21 items. When both agents report they want the same
set X of size 3 from M , by EFX and welfare maximizing, we get that the allocation must be
such that one agent receives two items among X and the other receives the third and all items
not in X. By a counting argument we get that there are 6 items a, b, x1, x2, x3, x4, such that for
every X = {a, b, xi} for i ∈ [4] the same agent receives exactly the set {a, b} and the other agent
receives M \ {a, b}. This is true since there are (m3 ) sets of size 3, and only 2 · (m2 ) allocations
that gives one agent 2 items and the other, the rest of the items. Since for m ≥ 21 it holds that(m
3
)
> 3 · 2 · (m2 ), we get that there are four sets of size 3 with the same allocation. We assume
w.l.o.g., that agent 1 is the agent that receives a, b whenever both agents reports {a, b, xi}.
By truthfulness and welfare maximizing if agent 2 changes his report to M \ {a, b}, agent 1
receives {a, b} and agent 2 receives M \ {a, b}. If agent 1 reports he wants {a, b, x1, x2, x3, x4}
and agent 2 reports he wants M \ {a, b} then by EFX agent 1 must receive at least 3 items and
a, b among them. Contradicting that it is truthful for him to report {a, b, xi} for every i ∈ [4].

G Group Strategyproofness
In this appendix we consider the aspect of group strategyproofness of our PE and RPE allocation
mechanisms. A mechanism is strongly group strategyproof if there is no deviation by a group
in which every member of the group weakly gains, and one strictly so. A mechanism is weakly
group strategyproof if there is no deviation by a group in which every member of the group
strictly gains.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [14] prove that for unit-demand dichotomous valuations, no Pareto
optimal deterministic allocation mechanism is strongly group strategyproof. As the class of
submodular dichotomous valuations that we consider contains unit-demand valuations, strong
group strategyproof is not obtainable in our setting. For randomized allocation we have the
following impossibility:
Observation 46 No randomized allocation mechanisms for submodular dichotomous valua-
tions can be simultaneously ex-ante strongly group strategyproof, ex-post Pareto optimal and
EF1.
Proof. Consider a setting with three agents a1, a2, a3 with dichotomous valuations and four
items e1, e2, e3, e4. Agent a1 is additive over e1, e2, agent a2 is additive over e3, e4, and agent a3
is unit demand over all items. In every EF1 PO allocation, all items are allocated, and a3 gets
exactly one item. In a randomized allocation mechanism that is ex-post EF1 and PO, w.l.o.g.,
a3 has positive probability of receiving item e1. Then the group {a1, a3} has a deviation that
benefits a1 without hurting a3, and this is for a3 to report that a3 is unit demand over e3, e4.
With this deviation, in every realized allocation that is EF1 and PO, agent a1 gets both e1 and
e2 (sometimes gaining an item), whereas agent a3 still gets one item in that realization (either
e3 or e4) and losses nothing. 
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We next discuss the weaker notion of weak group strategyproofness, as well as the prop-
erties of our mechanisms for the additive case. For additive dichotomous valuations, our PE
mechanism is weakly group strategyproof, as shown by Halpern et al. [36]. The next example
shows that our PE allocation mechanism (and likewise the mechanism of Halpern et al. [36]) is
not strongly group strategyproof, even if the dichotomous valuations are additive.
Example 47 There are three agents, 1,2 and 3, and two items, a and b. The agents are ordered
according to their priorities (i.e., agent 1 has higher priority than agents 2 and 3, and agent 2
has higher priority than agent 3). Agent 1 wants both items a, b, while agent 2 wants only item
a, and agent 3 wants item b. If agents 1, 3 collaborated and agent 1 reports he wants only item
a, then, agent 3 gains an item, while agent 1 does not lose an item.
We next show an example in which our RPE mechanism in Section 3.3 is neither ex-ante
Lorenz dominating, nor weakly group strategyproof, even if the dichotomous valuations are
additive.
Example 48 There are eight agents a1, . . . , a8 with dichotomous additive valuations over twelve
items e1, . . . e12. Agents a1, . . . , a4 each wants only items e1, . . . , e6, whereas agents a5, . . . , a8
each wants all twelve items. In any realized allocation, agents a5, . . . , a8 combined get at least
six items. The fractional Lorenz dominating allocation gives every agent 32 items. However,
when agents a5, . . . , a8 have highest priority, they get eight items under PE. Hence under RPE
each of them gets average value strictly greater than 32 due to symmetry (and as they always get
at least 6 items), whereas each of agents 1 to 4 gets average value strictly smaller than 32 . This
establishes that RPE is not ex-ante Lorenz dominating.
If agents a5 and a6 change their reports to be e1, . . . , e9 and agents a7 and a8 change their
reports to be {e1, . . . , e6} ∪ {e10, e11, e12} then there is no priority order in which the group
a5, . . . , a8 gets fewer items than they would get under truthful reporting (with the same priority
order). However, on priority order a7, a8, a1, . . . a6 they get one more item compared to truthful
reporting. Symmetry arguments imply that in expectation, any member of the group a5, . . . , a8
strictly gains from the deviation above. Hence RPE is not weakly group strategyproof.
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